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REBASING ‘MADDISON’: NEW INCOME COMPARISONS AND 
THE SHAPE OF LONG-RUN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1 
 




Economists’ understanding of long-run economic development has greatly improved thanks to 
the historical statistics compiled by the late Angus Maddison. Yet his method for comparing 
income levels across countries and over time has come under increasing criticism. New 
estimates of comparative income level often show markedly different outcomes than 
Maddison’s projection (or extrapolation) method based on a single, modern-day relative income 
benchmark. In this paper, we draw on modern and historical cross-country income comparisons 
and incorporate these into a novel measure of real GDP per capita over the very long run. The 
resulting new version of the Maddison Project Database thereby does greater justice to 
historical insights and provides a fresh impetus for future research. We present applications to 
estimating cross-country income convergence and the Balassa-Samuelson effect and 
demonstrate that how our new measure of real GDP per capita is a substantial improvement. 
(JEL: C43, C82, E01, N10, O47) 
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Angus Maddison has greatly contributed to economists’ understanding of long-run economic 
development through his Historical Statistics of the World Economy.2 By judiciously 
combining estimates of comparative levels of real GDP per capita in recent periods with long-
term time series of growth of GDP per capita, his database provides the broadest coverage of 
comparative income data and is amongst the most widely used sources of economic data in the 
world. Especially for the period before 1950, this is the dominant database, providing 
systematic and broad cross-country information on comparative income levels.3 Since his 
passing, the development of the Maddison Project Database (MPD) has moved to a new 
generation of scholars.4 In this paper we introduce a new approach to the measurement of real 
GDP per capita over the very long and introduce a new version of the database. 
Most importantly, we ‘rebase’ the MPD by incorporating a wealth of historical data on 
comparative living standards and economic activity, much of which builds on Maddison’s 
pioneering work. The latest series developed by Maddison were based on a single modern-day 
cross-country comparison of relative income levels, for the year 1990, projected forwards and 
backwards using data on growth of GDP per capita. Yet extended back over many decades and 
even centuries, these projections diverged substantially from independent ‘benchmark’ 
comparisons of relative income or living standards for early periods.5 This is consistent with a 
recent literature on how differences in real GDP per capita between benchmarks comparisons 
can diverge from GDP growth from national statistics over the same period.6 Changing 
economic structures and measurement error and biases in cross-country price comparisons are 
important explanations for such differences. But especially over longer time scales, growth 
figures also turn unreliable, especially when covering periods of war, rapid inflation or weak-
to-non-existent statistical systems. A consequence is that research results can be sensitive to the 
version of a database that is used in a study.7 This has been one reason why versions 8 and 9 of 
the Penn World Table (PWT) introduced real GDP series that rely on multiple benchmark 
comparisons of prices and income; see Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015). 
                                                 
2 See Maddison (1995, 2001, 2007). 
3 Though Barro and Ursúa (2008) have gone to great lengths to better capture data on economic fluctuations for 
42 countries since 1800. 
4 See Bolt and van Zanden (2014) for a first new version. 
5 Prominent examples are Prados de la Escosura (2000) and Lindert and Williamson (2016). 
6 See Deaton (2010), Deaton and Aten (2017) and Inklaar and Rao (2017).  
7 See Johnson, Larson, Papageorgiou and Subramanian (2013) and Ciccone and Jarociński (2010). 
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In this paper, we implement a multiple benchmark approach for the MPD based, primarily, on 
(i) post-1950 price benchmarks (as also used in PWT) and (ii) pre-1950 real GDP per capita 
benchmarks based on a variety of historical studies.8,9 In our new dataset on historical 
benchmarks we incorporate relative income levels for 36 out of the 77 countries for which there 
are income estimates available prior to 1950. By integrating independent comparative income 
estimates for earlier periods, the measurement of long-term relative income developments is 
more closely related to research covering this historical period. An important benefit is that 
subsequent new, contemporaneous price and income comparisons – such as a new round of the 
International Comparison Program (ICP) – can be incorporated into the MPD without these 
new numbers rewriting history; only new historical research can rewrite (or affirm) current 
estimates. In addition, we incorporate recent estimates of historical national accounts for a range 
of countries to provide a new version of the MPD that is state-of-the-art and provides a more 
extensive picture of comparative income levels than had been available thus far, with coverage 
for over 160 countries and the period from Roman times to the present. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a guided tour of the data 
in the MPD, highlighting the main variables, briefly discussing their construction and indicating 
areas of research where they can be helpful. As in newer versions of PWT, the MPD 
distinguishes between a series of real GDP that is useful for comparing income levels across 
countries and a series that is useful for comparing growth performance over time. We also use 
this section to emphasize that our measurement goal is GDP per capita, i.e. an economy’s 
productive, income-generating capacity. While GDP per capita relates to the standard of living 
in a country or the broader wellbeing of its population, it is certainly not the same concept; this 
should be borne in mind throughout. Section 3 discusses in greater detail the methodology for 
comparing income levels, at a point in time, but especially over a (long) period of time. Section 
4 discusses the implementation of the multiple-benchmark approach including a discussion of 
the different types of information that are developed and used in the different periods. This also 
includes a discussion of how our chosen approach compares to other methods, such as indirect 
benchmark estimates.10 Section 5 discusses a number of applications, highlighting where the 
new database sheds new light on existing questions. We examine the shape of regional 
                                                 
8 With Ward and Devereux (2016) as a major contributor. 
9 Given limited estimates available for Africa, we apply an indirect method for estimating comparative income 
levels based on real wage comparisons, similar to Allen (2001) or Lindert and Williamson (2016), for the year 
1950. See Appendix D for more details. 
10 E.g. Prados de la Escosura (2000). 
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economic development, the estimation of cross-country income convergence, extending Barro 
(2015), the relationship between relative income and relative prices – the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect – in history and the gap between GDP per capita in the United Kingdom and the United 
States. We show that our new measure of real GDP per capita based on multiple cross-country 
income comparisons yields more reliable estimates of cross-country income convergence and 
more plausible estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. In Section 6 we conclude by stressing 
that we use this paper and this new version of the MPD not to solidify a ‘true’ account of relative 
income levels in history, but rather to provide a state-of-the-art snapshot and a statistical 
platform. We see this as an opportunity to acknowledge and emphasize where our current 
information is strongest and most reliable and in which places there are important gaps in our 
knowledge. This paper is thus also an invitation to other scholars to extend our knowledge and 
to bridge those gaps by contributing to the MPD in the future. 
2. User guide to the data 
The main aim of the MPD is to provide data on GDP per capita for comparisons of relative 
income levels across countries. This is often called ‘real GDP per capita’ in the international 
comparisons literature, where ‘real’ refers to the series being based on a common set of prices 
across countries. In the original work by Maddison (1995, 2001, 2007), such data was compiled 
by starting from a modern-day cross-country income comparison – for the year 1990 – and then 
using growth rates of GDP per capita from (reconstructed historical) National Accounts to make 
comparisons for earlier years. An attractive feature of those data was that the change in real 
GDP per capita over time matches the growth rate from those National Accounts. However, 
this internal consistency came at the expense of distorted real GDP per capita comparisons in 
earlier years; see Section 3 on how, for instance, changing consumption patterns can lead to 
such distortions. Limitations to data quality also means that estimating the growth of GDP per 
capita over many decades, or even centuries, is a hazardous undertaking that, despite the best 
effort of statisticians and researchers, will always be surrounded by a degree of uncertainty. As 
a result, earlier estimates of relative income levels diverge substantially from standalone 
benchmark comparisons or independent estimates of relative income for those early periods 
(e.g. Ward and Devereux, 2018 and Prados de la Escosura, 2000). 
In the new version of the MPD, we therefore introduce a new measure of real GDP per capita 
based on multiple benchmark comparisons of prices and incomes across countries. The 
resulting measure of real GDP per capita can best be understood as based on prices that are 
constant across countries but depend on the current year. In keeping with the terminology used 
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in the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al. 2015), we refer to this measure of real GDP per capita 
as 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐. This variable is expressed in 2011 US dollars by correcting for inflation in the 
United States to provide magnitudes that are comparable over time, but it is a ‘current’ measure 
in the sense that the (implicit) relative prices used for the cross-country comparisons differ over 
time. As a result, the relative income levels from this exercise more closely reflect direct 
historical income comparisons. We rely on a number of different types of price or income 
benchmarks in the construction of the MPD, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 
3. We provide labels for all income observations indicating the method used to obtain it.  
In addition to the 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 series, we provide a measure of growth of GDP per capita that relies 
on a single cross-country price comparison, for 2011. This series is also expressed in 2011 US 
dollars (and 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 = 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐 in 2011), but its defining feature is that it tracks the 
growth rate of GDP per capita as given in country National Accounts (or their historical 
reconstructions). Following PWT, we refer to this measure of real GDP per capita as 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐. This series is primarily useful for comparing growth rates of GDP per capita over 
time. To also allow for a comparison of total GDP, the MPD provides information on 
population, with variable 𝑃𝑂𝑃. For the historical (pre-1950) period, data is sometimes available 
for only population or only for GDP per capita, due to differences in basic data availability. 
In compiling this dataset, we set a number of priorities, in line with the earlier work of 
Maddison. First, the primary goal is to provide measures of GDP per capita, i.e. reflecting the 
productive capacity of economies. GDP per capita is a measure that easily diverges from more 
specific measures of comparative living standards of consumers or laborers,11 or more 
comprehensive measures of welfare, that account for differences in health, leisure and 
inequality.12 GDP per capita is typically highly correlated with such measures of wellbeing, but 
important differences can be seen. For example, in oil-rich countries in the Middle East (e.g. 
Qatar or United Arab Emirates), GDP per capita is considerably higher than household 
consumption per capita. An important benefit of GDP per capita is that it can be used not only 
as an (imperfect) indicator of wellbeing or living standards, but can also serve as the basis for 
productivity comparisons, which have the potential to shed more light on the (proximate) 
                                                 
11 As in e.g. Allen (2001) and Lindert and Williamson (2016). 
12 See e.g. Jones and Klenow (2016) or Gallardo Albarran (2017). 
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sources of cross-country income differences, such as differences in physical and human capital 
and productivity.13 
Another important choice is to maximize the coverage of countries and periods, to provide a 
broad view on economic development in history. This, again, mirrors the approach of 
Maddison, but comes at the cost of a sparser set of concepts covered. For example, PWT 
provides an expenditure-level breakdown of GDP, as well as measures of physical and human 
capital and productivity for the period since 1950 (Feenstra et al. 2015). In a more historical 
context, Barro and Ursúa (2008) provide data on consumption per capita, in addition to GDP 
per capita for a smaller set of countries. While cognizant of this trade-off, we hope that by 
providing the broadest possible canvas, the MPD can serve as basis for future research to extend 
it in other directions. 
By presenting two alternative real GDP per capita series, the differences become readily 
apparent and these can be quite substantial. For a telling example, Switzerland’s real GDP per 
capita in 1872 is either 67 percent of the US level (according to 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) or over 150 percent 
of the US level (according to 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐). Put differently, 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 is only 43 percent as large 
as 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐. This is the (perhaps unavoidable) result of having two independent 
measurements, one of the relative level (𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) and one of the growth rate (which implies 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐). Both series aim to capture different concepts, so for the question of the 
appropriate level, we would suggest that 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 is the most appropriate answer. However, 
𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 should not be used to compute growth rates over time since 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐 is the more 
appropriate measure when trying to understand relative growth rates. We discuss conceptual 
and practical reasons for divergences between these two series in Section 3.2, but this does not 
lead to a reconciliation of the two or an assessment whether measurement errors are larger in 
particular GDP growth series or in specific relative level comparisons. 
These considerations call for a degree of modesty about the precision of any given real GDP 
per capita number; see also the discussion of Deaton and Heston (2010) on uncertainties 
surrounding relative price (and thus relative income) measurement. We therefore also provide 
a separate set of estimates that follows the basic Maddison approach, linking his 1990 
benchmark with the estimates of the growth of GDP per capita according to the official national 
accounts and their predecessors in historical national accounting. 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Caselli (2005) or Hsieh and Klenow (2010). 
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3. Measurement of real GDP per capita 
3.1 Measurement at a point in time 
In any model of the economy that features non-traded as well as traded products, we can only 
measure real GDP per capita by measuring and comparing price levels across countries. One 
could compare real expenditure on traded products, using exchange rates to express nominal 
expenditure in real terms, but only if one is willing to assume that the law-of-one-price (LOP) 
holds. However, that is a strong assumption, already in modern times (e.g. Burstein and 
Gopinath, 2014), but even more so in historical periods when barriers to trade and limited 
market integration held sway (e.g. Irwin, 2005; O’Rourke, 2007). For non-traded products, 
there is no mechanism that would push prices towards the LOP and it is amongst the stronger 
empirical regularities in international economics that prices of non-traded products are 
systematically lower in low-income economies. This is usually explained using the Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis (Samuelson, 1994), whereby productivity differences between countries 
are larger in traded goods than in non-traded goods. As a country develops and its productivity 
in the traded sector increases, wages increase across the economy, leading to higher prices of 
non-traded products. As a result, differences in income levels would be substantially overstated 
if the comparison would be based on exchange-rate converted expenditure. 
So rather than relying on exchange rates, the objective should be to estimate real GDP per capita 
based on a comparison of prices of traded and non-traded products. Deaton and Heston (2010) 
provide an extensive overview of the conceptual (as well as practical) challenges in making 
such comparisons. From a conceptual perspective it might be a desirable goal to compare the 
cost of living, so that a real expenditure comparison can be interpreted as a comparison of utility 
across countries. However, in a world of non-homothetic and (quite possibly) non-identical 
preferences, a true cost-of-living comparison faces substantial conceptual and practical 
challenges, though see Neary (2004) for an approach of comparing cost-of-living assuming 
identical but non-homothetic preferences. 
A more achievable goal is to compare a weighted average of relative prices across countries, 
drawing on index number theory. Let 𝐩𝑗 be the vector of prices in country 𝑗 and let 𝐪𝑗 be the 
vector of products. Nominal GDP in country 𝑗 is then 𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑗 = 𝐩𝑗
′ 𝐪𝑗, the sum of spending on 
(domestic) products.14 Given these vectors for two countries, we can implement the thought 
                                                 
14 This implies that imported products enter in 𝐪𝑗 with a negative sign. 
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experiment ‘what would a person in country 𝑘 have to spend to purchase the same bundle of 
products as a person in country 𝑗’ to arrive at the Laspeyres price index. The Paasche price 
index is the outcome of the reverse though experiment, switching the bundle of products to that 














Neither of the these thought experiments is inherently preferable as there is no reason why either 

















The Fisher index has numerous desirable properties, amongst which is that if two countries are 
compared where the consumer’s utility function has a homothetic, quadratic functional form, 
this index will exactly measure the ratio of utilities 𝑢𝑘 𝑢𝑗⁄  (Diewert, 1976).  
In a setting of many countries, a drawback of the Fisher index is that price comparisons are not 
transitive, i.e. the results depend on the base country, 𝑗 here. As a result, comparing prices 




𝐹 . To overcome this lack of transitivity we compare prices between 𝑗 and 𝑘 as the 
average across all possible indirect comparisons with country ℎ = 1, … , C to arrive at the so-










The GEKS index is the most widely-used approach for comparing prices across countries, with 
it being the main method in the International Comparison Program (ICP) at the World Bank 
(2014) for computing global relative prices, or purchasing power parities (PPPs). An especially 
desirable property of the GEKS index is that it does not suffer from substitution bias, i.e. the 
GEKS index is based on the bundles of products 𝐪𝑗 of all countries rather than relying on some 
average bundle. Maddison relied on Geary-Khamis (GK) PPPs for his international 
                                                 
15 After Gini, Eltetö, Köves, and Szulc. A modern treatment and references are provided by Balk (2008). 
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comparisons and this index does suffer from substitutions bias. As illustrated by, for instance, 
Deaton and Heston (2010), this substitution bias causes the GK PPPs to understate prices in 
low-income countries, thereby overstating their real GDP per capita levels and thus understating 
the extent of cross-country income differences. 




𝐺𝐸𝐾𝑆  (4) 
which allows for comparing GDP or GDP per capita between countries 𝑗 and 𝑘, evaluated at 
common prices. 
3.2 Measuring real GDP per capita over time 
The exposition so far has focused on price and comparisons across countries in a given year. 
Yet the main goals of the MPD is to provide data over time. The simplest approach is the so-
called projection or extrapolation approach. In this approach real GDP per capita 𝑦𝑗𝑡 ≡ 𝑌𝑗𝑡/𝑁𝑗𝑡 





where 𝑔𝑗𝑡  is the growth of GDP per capita in constant national prices. An important 
consequence of the approach in equation (5) is that the time series of growth in GDP per capita 
is the same in national prices and in PPP-converted US dollars. Furthermore, the change in the 





] , (6)⁄  
where 𝜋𝑗𝑡 = 𝑃𝑗𝑡 𝑃𝑗𝑡−1⁄ − 1, the rate of inflation of the GDP deflator.  
While straightforward, this extrapolation approach has important conceptual and practical 
drawbacks. The conceptual argument can be seen by considering the time-series counterpart to 



















Equation (7) makes clear that a price index for national inflation should be computed using the 
bundle of products in the two periods for country 𝑗. Yet as equation (2) makes clear, a good 
measure of relative prices should take into account the bundle of products in country 𝑗 and in 
country 𝑘. By ignoring country 𝑘’s bundle in the computation of inflation in country 𝑗 (and vice 
versa), the implicit relative price index in 𝑡 − 1 is no longer a good measure of relative prices 
between countries 𝑗 and 𝑘. Especially if the periods under comparison are far apart, the 
extrapolation approach of equations (5) and (6) is likely to be a poor approximation as the 
bundle of products will have shifted substantially over time. This is one clear reason why 
subsequent benchmark estimates of relative prices are (typically) not consistent with relative 
inflation over the intervening period.  
This conceptual problem is compounded by practical concerns. It has long been known that 
equation (6) does a poor job in predicting changes in PPPs over time,16 but when the results of 
the ICP PPP comparison for 2011 were released (World Bank, 2014), the differences with the 
previous, ICP 2005, results were very large despite the serious global effort that went into both 
sets of PPPs. As detailed in Deaton and Aten (2017) and Inklaar and Rao (2017), part of the 
inconsistency was due to biases introduced in the measurement of ICP 2005 PPPs, but even 
after correcting for theses biases the differences remained substantial. Furthermore, shifts in the 
bundles of products cannot fully account for these differences, leaving ‘measurement error’ of 
some sort as the main (though not very informative) explanation. 
This view matches that of Maddison, who argued that the difference between observed PPPs in 
successive ICP rounds and extrapolations based on relative inflation was more likely due to 
errors in the ICP estimates than errors in the national growth measures. Reconciling different 
benchmarks with the time series was in his eyes not the preferred method for long-term 
comparisons. The basis for this argument was a study by Kravis and Lipsey (1991), who also 
suggested that estimates of growth rates should be taken from the national accounts, whereas 
estimates of real GDP per capita should be done by benchmark studies (Maddison, 1995, p. 
164). 
Yet the approach of Maddison has notable limitations. For one, if any given benchmark 
comparison of prices and income is imperfect and perturbed by measurement error, relying fully 
on a single benchmark comparison would mean that the same error would affect real GDP per 
                                                 
16 See Deaton and Heston (2010) for notable contributions to this discussion. 
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capita estimates through the decades or centuries. Second, while time series of GDP per capita 
growth (i.e. 𝑔𝑗𝑡) may be considered reliable in modern times for many countries, periods like 
the World Wars, or periods of economic instability such as in much of Latin America in the 
1980s diminish the reliability of statistics. The situation is more problematic in countries with 
poorly developed statistical systems, such as in many African countries, which can lead to 
unreliable growth figures.17 
This was illustrated by Prados de la Escosura (2000), who argued that PPPs based on 
extrapolations as in equation (6) led to implausible results. His solution was to rely on the 
regularity of the price-income relationship to estimate what relative prices (and, as result, 
income levels) would have been if we had been able to observe them historically, see also 
Klasing and Milionis (2014). Relying heavily on such estimates is less appealing to us, most 
importantly because there are still important aspects of the price-income relationship that are 
not fully understood. For example, Hassan (2016) argues that the price-income relationship is 
non-linear and negative, rather than positive at the lower income levels and Zhang (2017) 
argues that mismeasured differences in product quality bias the price-income relationship. That 
said, comparing price levels rather than only income levels can serve as a useful check on 
relative income estimates derived according to a given methodology, see e.g. Section 5.3 on the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect in the MPD. For the MPD more broadly, we implement a multiple-
benchmark approach as detailed in the following section, which is, we argue, the best 
approximation of relative levels of GDP per capita over time. 
4. Implementation 
4.1 The MPD measurement approach 
In the new version of MPD, we implement a multiple benchmark approach based on post-1950 
ICP benchmarks and historical benchmarks, i.e. independent real GDP per capita benchmarks 
from historical studies.18 In keeping with Maddison (2007), we also include several estimates 
stretching back even further, but which should be seen as estimates of income relative to a bare-
bones subsistence level rather than explicitly comparing GDP per capita between countries. 
                                                 
17 See e.g. Henderson, Storeygard and Weil (2012), Young (2012) and Jerven (2013). 
18 Additionally, we use estimates of PPPs for 1960 from the study of Braithwaite (1968) and for a range of African 
countries, we make an indirect income comparison based on real wages and urbanization data, see Appendix D. 
There are a few countries that have never participated in an ICP comparison; most importantly Afghanistan and 
North Korea. For those countries we use the (econometrically) estimated real GDP per capita level from World 
Bank (2014). Cuba also requires also requires special consideration, see Appendix C for details. 
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Using the methodology developed for PWT (Feenstra et al. 2015), we subsequently tie the long-
term income series from the MPD (2013) to the relative income levels, thereby taking into 
account relative price changes between the different benchmark years. This means the MPD 
estimates for a particular country and year can be based on direct benchmark estimates, 
interpolation between benchmarks or extrapolation from the first or last benchmark, following 
equation (5). To enable users to distinguish between these different types of observations, we 
introduce clear labeling in the MPD. Furthermore, given the differences in the types of 
benchmark, we also label which type of benchmark is used to derive a certain estimate. 
As discussed in the previous section, problematic estimates in benchmarks or time series can 
have substantial consequences over longer periods of time. Given our stated goal of more 
closely aligning to our understanding of living standards in history, this requires a degree of 
judgement when implementing our multiple benchmark approach. In particular, it can be the 
case that a) benchmark relative price estimates diverge substantially from what might be 
expected from an estimated price-income relationship using all ICP benchmark PPPs 
observations; b) income levels can drop below subsistence for sustained periods of time; or c) 
income levels can remain high, in direct contradiction to the historical record. These 
observations result in a list of judgmental adjustments, by, for instance, excluding specific ICP 
PPP benchmarks or cutting short time series; see Appendix B for details. Category c 
observations consist of oil-rich economies whose current high income levels can be understood 
from large oil earnings, but where high income levels prior to major oil development or prior 
to high oil prices would run counter to the historical understanding of those countries; see 
Appendix E. 
4.2 Historical benchmarks 
Starting with the pioneering work by Rostas (1948) economists and economic historians have 
produced benchmarks of the relative income or output levels of economies (or parts of them, 
such as the manufacturing sector), including the construction of relevant PPPs to make real 
comparisons. Various methods have been used, making use of the output/value added approach, 
the income approach, and the expenditure approach. Usually, these studies compare the leading 
economy (US, UK) with one or more other economies (Germany, France, or Japan) (Broadberry 
1998; Fukao et al. 2007). We collected the available historical economy-wide benchmarks and 
used them to re-anchor the historical time series following the PWT methodology described in 
the previous section; see Appendix A for a an overview of historical benchmarks and studies 
that we rely upon. As there are currently close to no historical benchmarks available for African 
13 
 
countries, we have created  additional benchmarks for the year 1950 for African countries, 
making use of an indirect approach using wages and urbanization rates (see Appendix D).  
In addition to the historical benchmarks, we follow Maddison’s approach to also include 
estimates of comparative income levels for some of the very earliest (pre-1500) years. As data 
for these early economies is increasingly scattered and it is often impossible to estimate 
historical trends, economic historians (Pamuk and Schatzmiller 2014, Scheidel and Friesen 
2009; Milanovic 2006) used a variety of information to assess to what extent those societies 
had income levels notably above the level of subsistence, i.e. was there sufficient surplus 
beyond subsistence for development. In particular estimates of real wages were used for this 
purpose. We update that approach by updating the subsistence line to $700 (2011 US dollars), 
in line with the $1.90/day global poverty line used by the World Bank (Ferreira et al. 2015).19 
4.3 Updating historical series 
This new version of the MPD includes all new historical estimates of GDP per capita over time 
that have become available since the previous update (Bolt and Van Zanden, 2014). Such 
updates are necessary as new work on historical national accounts appears regularly and is 
important as it provides us new insights in long term global development. This also allows more 
recent years, up to 2016, to be covered in the database. 
For the recent period the most important new work is Harry Wu’s reconstruction of Chinese 
economic growth since 1950, a project inspired by Maddison which produces state of the art 
estimates of GDP and its components for this important economy (Wu 2014). Given the large 
role China plays in any reconstruction of global inequality, this is a major addition to the dataset. 
Moreover, as we will see below, the new results show that the revised estimates of annual 
growth are in general lower than the official estimates. Lower growth between 1952 and the 
present however substantially increases the estimates of the absolute level of Chinese GDP in 
the 1950s (given the fact that the absolute level if determined by a benchmark in 1990 or 2011). 
This helps to solve a problem that was encountered when switching from the 1990 to the 2011 
benchmark, namely that when using the official growth estimates the estimated levels of GDP 
per capita in the early 1950s are substantially below subsistence back until 1890, and therefore 
too low. This possible inconsistency in the dataset is therefore ‘solved’ by making use of the 
                                                 
19 An income of $1.90 per person per day implies an annual per capita income of $693.50. To emphasize that these 
income estimates are a multiple of subsistence, rather than in observed monetary units, we round the subsistence 
level up by 1% to $700. 
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new, much improved set of estimates by Wu (2014). Most of the other additions to the 
Maddison project dataset relate to the period before 1914, as can be seen from Table 1.  
As is clear from this overview, in particular work on the early modern period (1500-1800) is 
producing more new time series over per capita GDP, often however making use of indirect 
methods to estimate its long term development. The ‘model’ for making such estimates based 
on the links between real wages, the demand for foodstuffs and agricultural output, which has 
been developed by Malanima (2010), Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013) and 
others, has now also been applied to Poland (Malinowski and Van Zanden 2016), Spanish 
America (Arroyo-Abad and Van Zanden 2015), and France (Ridolfi 2016). 
Table 1. New Additions to the Maddison Project Database 
Country Period Source 
Latin America 
Bolivia 1846–1950 Herranz-Loncán and Peres-Cajías (2016).  
Brazil 1850–1899 Barro and Ursúa (2008). 
Chile 1810–2004 Díaz Lüders and Wagner (2007) 
Cuba 1902–1958 Ward and Devereux (2012).  
Cuba 1960–1895 Santamaria Garcia (2005).  
Mexico 1550–1812 Arroyo Abad and Van Zanden (2016). 
Mexico 1812–1870 Prados de la Escosura (2009).  
Mexico 1870–1895 Bertola and Ocampo (2012). 
Mexico 1895–2003 Barro and Ursúa (2008). 
Panama 1906–1945 De Corso and Kalmanovitz (2016).  
Peru 1600–1812 Arroyo Abad, and van Zanden (2016). 
Peru 1812–1870 Seminario (2015).  
Uruguay 1870–2014 Bertola (2016).  
Venezuela 1830–2012 De Corso (2013). 
     
Europe 
England 1252–1870 Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen (2015) 
Finland 1600–1860 Eloranta, Voutilainen and Nummela (2016).   
France 1250–1800 Ridolfi (2016)  
Holland 1348–1807 Van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) 
Norway 1820–1930 Grytten (2015).  
Poland 1409–1913 Malinowski and Van Zanden (2017) 
Portugal 1530–1850 Palma and Reis (2016). 
Romania 1862–1995 Axenciuc (2012).  
Spain 1850–2016 Prados de la Escosura (2017). 
Sweden 1300–1560 Krantz (2017). 
Sweden 1560–1950 Schön and Krantz (2015). 
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UK 1700–1870 Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen (2015) 
     
Asia 
China 1952–2008 Wu (2014). 
China 1661–1933 Xu, Shi, van Leeuwen, Ni, Zhang, and Ma (2016). 
India 1600–1870 Broadberry, Custodis and Gupta (2015). 
Turkey   Pamuk (2009). 
Singapore 1900–1959 Barro and Ursúa (2008). 
















1700–1900 Fourie and Van Zanden (2013). 
Finally, we have extended the national income estimates for all countries in the database to 
include the most recent years, up until 2016, using various sources. The Total Economy 
Database (TED) was used to extend the GDP per capita up to 2016 for all countries included in 
TED, similar to what has been done for the latest update of the Maddison Project database (Bolt 
and van Zanden, 2014). For those countries not present in TED, we have used national accounts 
estimates from the UN to extend the GDP per capita series. We have also used the TED and the 
US Census Bureau’s International Data Base to extend the population estimates up until 2016.20 
Recently, the TED revised their China estimates from 1950 onwards based on Wu (2014). As 
discussed above, we also included Wu’s (2014) new estimates in this update. Lastly, we have 
extended the series for the former Czechoslovakia, the former Soviet Union and former 
Yugoslavia, based on GDP and population data for their successor states.  
                                                 




5.1 Shape of world income differences: regional perspective 
Combining the multiple (historical) benchmarks with the long term series of per capita income 
from the Maddison Project database changes the pattern of long term income development 
compared to the original income series. In this section we discuss the major changes between 
the original series and the updated series presented in the paper on a regional level. It is 
important to realize though, that sometimes the effect is not only driven by switching from the 
1990 benchmark of Maddison to a new set of relative prices but could also be the result of 
updates of the underlying national account statistics.21 
Figure 1. Average real GDP per capita across regions, 1870–2015 
 
Notes: Figure shows 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 by region, using population to compute a regional GDP per capita level. 
Figure 1 illustrates the long-run improvement of real GDP per capita, following the regional 
organization of Maddison, with the United States as part of ‘Western Offshoots’. The figure 
illustrates a Great Divergence period, with especially East Asian income levels barely 
                                                 
21 Note that for the period after 1950, we rely, as far as possible, on official statistics for GDP at current and 
constant prices, population and relative prices from ICP comparisons or regional comparisons, such as done by 
Eurostat. We take these at face value, even in cases where there may doubts about the quality or veracity of the 
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improving relative to the richest regions until 1950. The figure also illustrates that patterns of 
rapid improvement alternate with period of relative decline, as in Western Asia in the 1980s, 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s and Africa in both the 1980s and 1990s. 
Table 2. Real GDP per capita by region and major countries for new and previous 
methodology, in 2011 US dollars 
  1870   1910   1950   2011   
  MPD Extrapolation MPD Extrapolation MPD Extrapolation MPD Extrapolation 
Western Offshoots 3692 3758 7518 7627 14867 14913 48569 48569 
United States 3736 3736 7586 7586 15241 15241 49675 49675 
Western Europe 2480 3643 4624 5812 6078 8163 38046 38046 
United Kingdom 3846 5716 5917 7567 9441 10846 34971 34971 
France 2383 3086 4551 4878 6869 8531 36691 36691 
Germany 2362 3715 5386 6763 5536 7840 43189 43189 
Western Asia     2386 4296 21298 21298 
Saudi Arabia 795 2495   4272 10703 48470 48470 
Iraq 917 4197   2820 9542 11484 11484 
Eastern Europe     4716 5414 17939 17939 
Poland 1267 1921 2169 3287 3141 4760 21837 21837 
Latin America 943 1423 1792 2358 3048 4222 13899 13899 
Brazil 751 1405 686 1283 1549 2898 14831 14831 
Argentina 2514 2578 6547 6713 8542 8759 20003 20003 
Mexico 789 1246 1690 2667 2648 4179 15210 15210 
East Asia 811 808   1147 1005 8829 8829 
China 751 754   757 637 10221 10221 
India 878 710 1371 927 1417 824 4768 4768 
Japan 985 1160 1741 2052 2519 3023 34979 34979 
Africa     1596 1775 4487 4487 
Egypt 1146 1999   1983 3219 10737 10737 
Nigeria     1503 1961 5136 5136 
South Africa 1681 1916 2397 2731 5278 6015 11838 11838 
Note: ‘MPD’ is based on the real GDP per capita figures based on the variable 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐, column ‘Extrapolation’ 
is based on the figures for 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐, which are computed following the methodology as originally employed 
by Maddison for estimating real GDP per capita over time. 
Table 2 contrasts the real GDP per capita figures based on 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 with those based on 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐, i.e. MPD vs. extrapolations. For the two poorest regions in the dataset, Africa and 
East Asia, the pattern of long term development does not change drastically. For Africa, the 
average level of GDP per capita in 1950 is a bit lower in the new database compared to the 
original income estimates, while for East Asia it is roughly the same in both databases. 
However, for individual countries, the change in early income estimates are sometimes quite 
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substantial. For Africa as a whole, the main difference between the two series is the more severe 
drop in incomes during the so called ‘lost decades’ of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Using multiple benchmarks result in substantially lower relative income levels for Latin 
America, most notably for the mid-20th century, where relative average income drops to 23 
percent of the US level, down from 32 percent based on the extrapolation method. The new 
methodology also clearly affects the pattern of average income development in Western Asia 
and Eastern Europe, again particularly after 1910. Incomes for Eastern Europe are now higher 
until the mid-1980s, with income levels on par with Western Europe around 1960 (which is 
also partly due to lower incomes in Western Europe, see below). In Western Asia the effects of 
using more relative income estimates translates mainly in much lower incomes up until the mid-
1990s after which increasing oil prices result in enormous increases in average incomes.22  
Western Europe is the region for which most relative income estimates are available. 
Incorporating this the new information results in substantially lower income estimates for the 
region compared to US incomes. The extrapolated method of Maddison indicates that the US 
and Western Europe were about on par around 1870, after which the US forged ahead of Europe 
until the end of WW2. Thereafter Europe’s economies expanded rapidly, until average incomes 
reached around 73 percent of the US level during the 1970s. After this, relative incomes 
remained fairly stable until the present. As a result of integrating the historical benchmarks, 
Europe seems behind the US already substantially in the 1870. Growth rates of both the US and 
Europe’s economies are then very similar until roughly the Great Depression. Then incomes 
initially diverge somewhat until the end of World War 2, but Europe’s incomes grow faster 
after 1950s to roughly 77 percent of the level of US incomes in 2011. 
In Table 3, we compare real GDP per capita relative to the United States based on the MPD 
(𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐), on extrapolation (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐) and on Maddison’s 1990 benchmark combined with 
the most recent time series of GDP per capita growth. Especially in the early two benchmark 
years, 1870 and 1910, the Maddison estimates are typically in between the MPD and 
extrapolation estimates. In several cases, the MPD estimate is also closer to Maddison than to 
the extrapolation; for example for Western Europe or Latin America in 1910. This could reflect 
that the 2011 ICP benchmark (from which the extrapolated series start) is a further two decades 
removed from those older periods, but also that Maddison had made judicious choices in his 
                                                 
22 For a detailed discussion on income estimates for oil-rich countries, see Appendix E. 
19 
 
benchmarks and time series. In either event, using the multiple-benchmark approach of the 
MPD prevents the real GDP per capita estimates from drifting further from conventional 
historical views in a way that relying on the ICP 2011 income estimates would not have. 
Table 3. Comparing real GDP per capita: MPD 2017 versus Maddison (US=1) 
  1870     1910     
  MPD Extrapolation Maddison MPD Extrapolation Maddison 
Western Offshoots 0.99 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.00 
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Western Europe 0.66 0.98 0.88 0.61 0.77 0.68 
Western Asia 
      
Eastern Europe 
      
Latin America 0.25 0.38 0.33 0.24 0.31 0.27 
East Asia 0.22 0.22 0.25    
Africa 
      
       
 1950   2011   
 MPD Extrapolation Maddison MPD Extrapolation Maddison 
Western Offshoots 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Western Europe 0.40 0.54 0.48 0.77 0.77 0.67 
Western Asia 0.16 0.28 0.17 0.43 0.43 0.23 
Eastern Europe 0.31 0.36 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.27 
Latin America 0.20 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.24 
East Asia 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.18 0.20 
Africa 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.06 
Notes: Table shows real GDP per capita relative to the United States in every year. MPD is based on 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐, 
extrapolation is based on 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐 and Maddison is based the Maddison 1990 benchmark and current time 
series, made available in a separate data file. 
5.2 Convergence analysis 
The long time span of the MPD lends itself well to analyzing convergence dynamics; the 
question whether countries with low income levels subsequently tend to show faster economic 
growth. Such a relationship is expected based on many growth models and, empirically, there 
is much support for such a relationship. As discussed and shown in Barro (2015), it seems 
reasonable to conclude that income levels converge at rate of approximately 2 percent per year, 
conditional on (fixed) country characteristics. Yet to condition on country characteristics using 
country fixed effects, it is very important to have time series spanning 140 years or more. As 
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Barro (2015) argues, Hurwicz-Nickell bias23 is sizeable in datasets of only 50 years, with a 
downward bias to the convergence coefficient of 0.056 and econometric approaches to 
correcting for this bias are found wanting. Once the length of the time series exceeds 140 years, 
the bias drops below 0.018, down to 0.010 for 200 years. 
The results of Barro (2015) can be usefully re-examined using our new version of the MPD. 
Most importantly, the new version of the database allows us to combine the preferred measure 
of growth in real GDP per capita, based on 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐, with the preferred measure of the level 
of real GDP per capita across countries, 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐. We would not expect different outcomes 
regarding the rate of convergence, but we rather view the results in terms of measurement error 
in the independent variable: an improved measure of the level of real GDP per capita (𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 
rather than 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐) should lead to a more accurate estimate of the rate of convergence. 
This is helpful in itself, but also for tests of Schumpeterian growth theory, where typically the 
interaction between a country’s distance to the (productivity) frontier and a variable of interest 
plays a central role; see Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2014) for a survey and Madsen (2014) for 
an example in a long-term perspective. More reliable measures of the relative position of 
countries – i.e. smaller measurement error – will make it easier to establish the information 
content of such models. 
Another reason to revisit the analysis of Barro (2015) is that we have a more extensive dataset. 
Barro (2015) used the dataset of Barro and Ursúa (2008), which covers 28 countries with annual 
data since 1896. As discussed in Section 4.3, the new MPD, incorporates data of Barro and 
Ursúa (2008) for some countries as well as new source material developed by economic 
historians for numerous other countries. This allows us to extend the start of the analysis period 
to 1820 and broaden the range of countries to 38, including data for countries such as Indonesia, 
India and South Africa – each important for establishing the breadth of a finding of cross-
country income convergence. 
We follow Barro (2015) and estimate the following model: 
?̂?𝑖,𝑡
5 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽 log 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−5 + 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖 𝑡 (7) 
                                                 
23 This bias stems from including lagged dependent variable alongside fixed effects and forces down the coefficient 
on the lagged dependent variable. Since countries with lower income levels are expected to grow faster, the 
estimated coefficient is more negative than it should be. 
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− 1, the equation includes country and year fixed effects and in our 
preferred estimation 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−5 = 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−5 though we also estimate equation (7) with 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−5 =
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−5 to compare to earlier studies. Additional control variables 𝑋𝑘 are also 
considered, though the scope is limited by the long time span required. The equation is 
estimated using data for non-overlapping periods, so 1820–1825, 1825–1830, …, 2010–2015. 
Table 4. Income convergence in MPD – 𝑹𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑵𝑨𝒑𝒄 and 𝑪𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP/capita measure RGDPNApc RGDPNApc CGDPpc CGDPpc CGDPpc CGDPpc 
log(lagged GDP/capita) -0.0259*** -0.0203*** -0.0245*** -0.0223*** -0.0207*** -0.0257*** 
 (0.00404) (0.00536) (0.00311) (0.00443) (0.00653) (0.00750) 
Male years of schooling  -0.000130  0.000162  0.000213 
  (0.00317)  (0.00286)  (0.00283) 
Female years of schooling  -0.00103  -0.00116  -0.00121 
  (0.00361)  (0.00319)  (0.00315) 
Democracy  -0.0168  -0.00997  -0.00933 
  (0.0363)  (0.0359)  (0.0355) 
Democracy-squared  0.0219  0.0174  0.0169 
  (0.0320)  (0.0318)  (0.0316) 
log(lagged GDP/capita), 
RGDPNApc 
    -0.00472 0.00404 
    (0.00864) (0.00953) 
       
Observations 1217 912 1208 911 1208 911 
Period 1820+ 1870+ 1820+ 1870+ 1820+ 1870+ 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is average annual growth in real GDP per capita, measured by 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐 for the 37 countries with annual data starting no later than 1890. The measure used for lagged 
GDP/capita differs across columns. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. All 
regressions include country and time fixed effects. All independent variables are measured in the starting year of 
each five-year period, so 1820, 1825, etc. 
Sources: MPD (2017), supplemented by the Polity IV dataset (www.systemicpeace.org) for democracy and Lee 
and Lee (2016) for years of schooling, both available since 1870. The democracy measure is computed as the 
Polity’s democracy score minus its autocracy score, transformed from a -10 to +10 scale to a 0–1 scale, as in Barro 
(2015). 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of equation (7) in various forms. Columns (1) and (2) use 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐 to measure the level of GDP per capita and are thereby closest to the results 
presented in Barro (2015, Table 5). The estimation differs only in the larger country coverage 
(37 versus 28) and the longer time period in column (1). The results are very similar to those of 
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Barro (2015), with an estimated convergence rate of close to 2 percent per year. The addition 
of control variables, in the form of measures of schooling and democracy, does not substantially 
affect the results, though the estimated convergence rate is somewhat reduced. 
Columns (3) and (4) show our preferred approach and replace 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐 by 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 to 
measure the level of GDP per capita, while the growth rate is still computed using 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐. 
The estimated convergence rate is quite similar to those in columns (1) and (2), but a notable 
result is that the standard error on the coefficient of log(lagged GDP per capita) is 15–20 percent 
lower. In columns (5) and (6), we include both measures of the level of GDP per capita at the 
same time. The two measures are highly correlated (0.97) but in those columns, too, we find 
that it is log(𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) which remains significant. We take this as further evidence that our 
newly introduced measure 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 is a more reliable measure of cross-country income 
differences, conditional on the belief that there is a process of conditional income convergence.  
5.3 The Balassa-Samuelson effect 
The Balassa-Samuelson (or Penn) effect states that the price level in a country tends to increase 
as it becomes richer and this effect has been a robust feature in the ICP PPP data since that 
program’s inception.24 Prados de la Escosura (2000) used the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect 
to propose alternative historical income estimates, after showing that the extrapolated data of 
Maddison implied price levels that differed substantially from what the BS-effect would 
predict. In this application, we estimate the BS-effect in three settings, namely based on the ICP 
PPP data from 1970 onwards (as in Feenstra et al., 2015), based on the historical income 
benchmarks (𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) and based on the extrapolated income series (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐). In order to 
estimate these last two BS-effects, we need information about relative price levels alongside 
the relative income estimates. These are either drawn directly from the benchmark comparisons 
or computed based on data on nominal GDP per capita, i.e. GDP converted to US dollars using 




) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln (
𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑈𝑆𝐴,𝑡
) + 𝜖𝑖 𝑡 (8) 
                                                 
24 See e.g. Barro (1991), Samuelson (1994), Rogoff (1996) and Feenstra et al. (2015). 
25 We thank Giovanni Federico for providing his most recent work in compiling nominal GDP data. 
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Where 𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the nominal exchange rate and 𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 is nominal GDP, for country 𝑖 at time 
𝑡.26 Over the full range of relative income levels, Hassan (2016) has shown that a linear 
relationship is not appropriate and he argues that a quadratic relationship is not only empirically 
superior but also expected based on a model of structural transformation. However, over the 
range of relative income levels spanned by the historical income benchmark data, a linear 
approximation leads to very similar results as a quadratic model in the case of the ICP PPP data 
and if a quadratic model is used to model the historical data this results in a concave, rather than 
Hasson’s (2016) convex quadratic relationship. For these reasons, we rely on the simple linear 
model of equation (8). 
Figure 2 shows the results of the analysis. Of the 68 historical benchmarks (i.e. pre-1950 
benchmarks) included in the MPD, we have nominal GDP per capita data for 57 so the two 
panels of the figure show 57 country observations of relative prices and (nominal) relative 
income levels. In the left-hand panel, we show price-income relationship using the relative 
prices implied by the historical benchmarks (i.e. by 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) while the right-hand panel shows 
the relationship based on extrapolated real GDP series (i.e. by 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐). Also shown in 
both panels is the price-income relationship based on ICP PPP data, estimated over the same 
income interval as the 57 observations. 
Figure 2 shows that relative prices based on extrapolation (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐) tend to be 
systematically lower than based on historical benchmarks (𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐), echoing a similar 
observation for a more limited sample in Prados de la Escosura (2000). This is most striking in 
the case of the three historical benchmarks for Switzerland (1872, 1910 and 1929). The 
country’s (nominal) relative income level was between 49 and 67 percent of the US level, while 
the extrapolation-based relative prices were between 28 and 31 percent. In ICP 2011, such low 
relative prices were seen in countries such as Bangladesh or Yemen, with nominal income 
levels of less than 5 percent of the US level. In comparison, the relative prices for Switzerland 
based on the historical benchmarks were between 71 and 98 percent of the US. While 
Switzerland is an extreme example, there are other countries, such as the UK, Netherlands and 
                                                 
26 Equation 8 can also be estimated using real GDP per capita, but the advantage of this specification is that the 
choice of (implied) PPP only affects the dependent variable and not the independent variable. We also express the 
relationship in terms of income levels relative to the United States, in parallel with expression of the price level 
relative to the United States, to enable estimation of 𝛽1 based on data for multiple years. 
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France, for which extrapolated relative price levels (of between 45 and 65 percent of the US 
level) are considerably lower than might be expected based on income levels.  
Figure 2. The relationship between relative prices and relative income levels 
 
Notes: Both panels show 57 country-year observations for which historical benchmark information is available 
and the relative price level and relative level of nominal GDP per capita can be computed. The panel ‘Historical 
benchmarks’ computes relative prices using nominal GDP per capita and 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐, the panel ‘Extrapolation’ uses 
nominal GDP per capita and 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐. The blue line in both panels is the regression line estimated using ICP 
PPP benchmarks in the same income range as both panels: ln (
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡




robust standard error of the slope coefficient is 0.0083. The red line in the ‘Historical benchmarks’ panel shows 
the regression line based on the observations in that panel: ln (
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡




slope coefficient robust standard error 0.040. The green line in the ‘Extrapolation’ panel shows the regression line 
based on the observations in that panel: ln (
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡
) = −0.582 + 0.209 ln (
𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖 𝑡
𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑈𝑆𝐴 𝑡
), with slope coefficient 
robust standard error 0.044. 
More generally, the historical benchmark observations show a price-income relationship that is 
fairly similar to the modern-day, ICP-based relationship, while the relationship based on 
extrapolated data differs more notably. This difference is driven in particular by high-income 
countries with low implied price levels based on extrapolated data and higher price levels 
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implied by the historical benchmarks. Note that these regression lines are meant to be 
illustrative rather than an attempt to provide a comprehensive statistical comparison. A 
comprehensive analysis would be challenging given the limited number of historical benchmark 
observations, but such a more complete model would, for example, also account for the degree 
of openness and differences in the monetary regime (Prados de la Escosura, 2000). The figure 
does illustrate that reliance on extrapolated time series risks ‘unmooring’ the resulting real GDP 
series from underlying economic relationships. 
5.4. Poverty and subsistence 
An important implication of using different relative price levels is that the poverty level may 
change. With the 1990 price levels, the subsistence level income was estimated at between 350 
and 400 international dollars per year (Maddison, 2007). The poverty line was equal to around 
$1 per day, and was based on the first international poverty line which was set at $1.01 per day 
using 1985 PPP’s, which was later updated to $ 1.08 per day using the 1993 PPP’s (Ravallion, 
Datt and van de Walle, 1991; Chen and Ravallion, 2001). This made the interpretation of 
historical income series very intuitive. By using other relative prices, this subsistence level of 
income changes. The price level (in US dollars, the standard used in these calculations) 
increased by 59% between 1990 and 2011, bringing the poverty line to 636 dollars of 2011. In 
a more extensive re-benchmarking, the World Bank raised the absolute poverty line to 1.90 US 
dollars a day, expressed in 2011 prices.  
The effects of rebasing the original Maddison estimates has the most notable effects for 
countries who experienced substantial price changes relative to the US between the benchmarks 
years. China is an interesting case in this perspective. When the 2005 PPPs were released, the 
prices for China had increased so much relative to the US, that total GDP per capita came out 
around 40% lower than China’s relative income based on earlier price estimates (Deaton and 
Heston, 2010: 3; Feenstra et. al, 2015). This led to implausibly low historical income estimates 
for China, given that the original estimates were already very close to subsistence around 1950 
(Maddison, 2007a). In the years after the release of the 2005 PPP’s consensus arose about the 
2005 shortcomings, most of which were corrected for in the 2011 ICP round (see e.g. Deaton 
and Aten, 2017). Still, relative prices for China relative to the US were substantially higher in 
2011 compared to 1990 which lowers China’s PPP adjusted income per capita in 2011 by 23%. 
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Figure 3. Historical income series China in 2011 US dollars 
 
The case of China is interesting more broadly, as illustrated in Figure 3. The green line shows 
GDP per capita as implied by the official National Accounts GDP series from 1952 onwards, 
extended backwards with historical growth estimates, tied to the ICP 2011 benchmark. Those 
official growth rates imply that before 1979, Chinese GDP per capita was below the $700 
subsistence line. This stretches credibility past the breaking point, as this would imply utter 
destitution for considerably more than a century. By contrast, the country with the lowest GDP 
per capita level in the ICP 2011 comparison was the Democratic Republic of Congo, at $680. 
This implication of the official Chinese growth rates had been recognized by Maddison who, 
jointly with Harry Wu, developed alternative growth estimates that aimed to correct for the 
substantial overestimation of official growth. The most recent work in this line is by Wu (2014), 
whose growth series from 1952 onwards is used for the GDP per capita line shown in red in 
Figure 3. In blue, we show the new MPD version that relies on multiple benchmarks: the ICP 
2011 results, the adjusted ICP 2005 results (Inklaar and Rao, 2017), and the historical 
benchmarks for 1935 (Fukao et al. 2007), 1912 (Ye and de Jong, 2017), 1840 (Broadberry, 
Guan and Li, 2013) and 1825 (van Zanden and Li, 2012). This blue line implies that, even if 
we had not relied on Wu’s (2014) GDP growth series, we would have avoided the extreme 
destitution before 1979 that is implied by official GDP statistics because the historical 
benchmarks peg China’s income level close to, but still above subsistence level. 
Looking more broadly into the subsistence threshold, the original Maddison project dataset 
includes 6 countries whose income was below 400 (1990) dollars per year for 10 years or more 
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(Afghanistan, Botswana, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi and Romania) and an 
additional 15 countries, many of these in Africa, with shorter spells. Using the new, multiple 
benchmark approach, there are 15 countries with an average income below 700 (2011) dollars 
per year, including Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Laos, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Peru, Romania and Rwanda. Most of 
these below-subsistence observations are in Africa, especially prior to 1960 or during periods 
of civil war. Given that we know still too little about economic development in Africa in earlier 
years,27 we would need more information about relative incomes for earlier periods to sensibly 
interpret relative development levels. The development of an independent (indirect) 1950 
benchmark (Appendix D) represents useful progress in this direction, but this would need to be 
extended to cover more formerly French African countries and especially Mozambique and 
Angola to provide a more comprehensive picture of the continent. 
5.5 When did the US overtake the UK? 
One of the debates in the study of long term economic growth has focused on the relative 
performance of the UK and the USA, and in particular the question when the USA overtook the 
UK. Maddison’s approach based on backward projection implied that until the 1870s the UK’s 
income level was about 40% higher than that of the USA, and that only after the 1870s the USA 
gradually overtook the UK; see Figure 4, the 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐 series. Broadberry (1998, 2003) came 
to similar conclusions, based on a benchmark comparison in 1937. These results have, however, 
been criticized recently by Ward and Devereux (2003, 2018), who created a set of independent 
benchmarks for 1872 and 1910 period, and by Lindert and Williamson (2016) who did similar 
research for the 18th century, indicating that the USA was at least on par with the UK at the 
time. Our new approach makes use of the new Ward/Devereux benchmarks for the 1872-1910 
period, using those as anchors. Figure 4 shows the new results, with series 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐, showing 
the two countries roughly on par until 1870, after which point the US economy gained a 
sustained income advantage. The fact that one of the Lindert and Williamson (2016) estimates, 
the estimate by Woltjer (2015), by Rostas (1948), and by Broadberry (1998, 2003) are on, or 
close to, the 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 series is an independent outcome. These independent matches provide a 
greater degree of plausibility to this new 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 series, in our view, though the fact that three 
of the Lindert/Williamson benchmarks deviate substantially suggests a degree of uncertainty. 
                                                 
27 Also the more recent income estimates for many African countries are sometimes of dubious quality (Jerven, 
2013; Henderson et al. 2012). 
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That said, if anything the UK’s income level relative to the US may have been lower rather than 
the much higher relative level implied by 𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐. 
Figure 4. Real GDP per capita in the United Kingdom relative to the United States 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper has introduced a new version of the Maddison Project Database (MPD), the 
successor to Angus Maddison’s historical statistics. The main novelty of our approach is to 
combine the full range of modern-day and historical estimates of relative GDP per capita with 
improved time series on growth in GDP per capita to provide a comprehensive, global picture 
of real GDP per capita from Roman times to the present. In contrast to Maddison’s last work, 
which is still widely used, the new MPD directly relies on the best current evidence of living 
standards and income across countries in the present day and in history – by construction. This 
feature is of great importance, not just to provide a more historically-grounded perspective of 
real GDP per capita through history, but also as an invitation to the research community. By 
incorporating new estimates of historical income levels, the MPD can serve as a platform 
through which such new research results can be placed in international perspective and provided 
to a broader audience. To provide a bridge to research based on Maddison’s prior cross-country 



























The incorporation of many historical benchmarks has an important effect on our understanding 
of long-term income trends. For example, the original Maddison statistics showed that it was 
not until the early 20th century that real GDP per capita in the United States overtook the level 
of real GDP per capita in the United Kingdom. But as historical evidence has accumulated, it 
has become increasingly clear that real GDP per capita in the United States was at comparable 
levels as in the United Kingdom already from the mid-19th century onwards. More broadly, we 
find that in the 19th century, the United States was farther ahead of countries around the world 
with, in particular, lower levels of real GDP per capita in Western Europe and Latin America. 
In a broader cross-country setting, we show that our new measure of comparative real GDP per 
capita is a more reliable measure for assessing the degree of income convergence and implies 
more plausible relative price levels than the Maddison method of extrapolating from a modern-
day income comparison. 
These new results do not claim to be the final word on these topics. Despite our inclusion and 
estimation of numerous historical benchmarks, our understanding of comparative income levels 
becomes based on sparser data as we move back further in time. This is particularly pressing in 
regions such as Africa and large parts of Asia, but there also important gaps in 19th century 
Latin America. Our hope is that our research contributes a fresh impetus to improving our 
understanding of historical income differences as this can only sharpen our understanding of 
why a relatively small set of countries managed to become much richer and to what extent those 
countries were different. As an example of what such research can achieve, take Broadberry 
and Wallis (2017), who find that avoiding a shrinking economy has been much more important 
than stimulating growth for reaching higher income levels. More fine-grained information and 
more comparative studies are crucial to broadening and deepening such understanding. 
Finally, we fully recognize that developing estimates of real GDP per capita is but a first step 
to a broader understanding of wellbeing. A fuller picture of well-being would (at least) 
distinguish between consumption and investment and, more generally, incorporate additional 
dimensions of wellbeing, such as health, leisure and inequality. A better understanding of 
differences in income and living standards would require information on the factors of 
production – human and physical capital – and productivity. Yet all such subsequent work relies 
heavily on reliable and informative data on income per capita and we hope that our new data 




A. Overview of historical benchmarks and new historical time series 
Table A.1: List of historical benchmark studies included in the paper.  
Benchmark Country Source Remarks 
1820 Netherlands Frankema, E., P. Woltjer and J.P. Smits 
(2013). Changing Economic Leadership, a 
new benchmark of sector productivity in the 
United States and Western Europe, ca. 1910, 
Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische 
Geschiedenis (The low countries social and 









1825 China Li, B. and J.L. van Zanden (2012). ‘Before the 
Great Divergence? Comparing the Yangzi 
Delta and the Netherlands at the Beginning of 
the Nineteenth Century’, The Journal of 
Economic History 72 (4) (2012) 956-989.  





1850 Netherlands Frankema, E., P. Woltjer and J.P. Smits 
(2013). Changing Economic Leadership, a 
new benchmark of sector productivity in the 
United States and Western Europe, ca. 1910, 
Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische 
Geschiedenis (The low countries social and 








1860 Indonesia Van Zanden, J.L. (2003). 'Rich and Poor 
before the Industrial Revolution: a 
comparison between Java and the Netherlands 
at the beginning of the 19th century', 
Explorations in Economic History 40, 1-23.  





1860 Germany Fremdling, R., Productivity comparison 
between Great Britain and Germany, 1855–
1913, Scandinavian Economic History 
Review 39 (1), 28-42 
  
1870 India Heston, A. and R. Summers, 1980. 
Comparative Indian Economic Growth: 1870 
to 1970, American Economic Review,  vol. 70 






1872 Australia Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 United States Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 Belgium Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 Canada Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 






Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 Switzerland Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 Denmark Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 Netherlands Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 Germany Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 Norway Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 France Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 Sweden Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1872 Italy Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 






1910 Australia Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 United States Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 Belgium Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 Canada Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 






Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 Switzerland Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 Denmark Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 Netherlands Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 Germany Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 Norway Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 France Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 Sweden Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 




1910 Italy Ward, M. and J. Devereux, 2018. New 
Perspectives on Productivity and Living 






1912 China Ma, Y. and de Jong, H. (2017), Unfolding the 
Turbulent Century: A Reconstruction of 
China's Historical National Accounts, 1840–





1913 Turkey Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating economic 
Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, 
pp. 809 - 828.  
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1913 Syria Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating economic 
Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, 
pp. 809 - 828.  
table 1, page 
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1913 Lebanon Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating economic 
Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, 
pp. 809 - 828.  
table 1, page 
7 
  
1913 Jordan Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating economic 
Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, 
pp. 809 - 828.  
table 1, page 
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1913 Egypt Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating economic 
Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, 
pp. 809 - 828.  
table 1, page 
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1913 Saudi Arabia Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating economic 
Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, 
pp. 809 - 828.  
table 1, page 
7 
  
1913 Iraq Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating economic 
Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, 
pp. 809 - 828.  
table 1, page 
7 
  
1913 Iran Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating economic 
Growth in the Middle East since 1820, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, 
pp. 809 - 828.  
table 1, page 
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1929 Australia Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
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1929 Austria Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Belgium Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Canada Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Czechoslovakia Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Denmark Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Finland Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 France Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Germany Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Hungary Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Ireland Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Italy Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Netherlands Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 New Zealand Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Norway Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Spain Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Sweden Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Switzerland Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Turkey Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1929 Great Brittain Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
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1929 Yugoslavia Clark, C. 1957. The Conditions of Economic 
Progress. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd 
    
1935 Germany Broadberry, S.N. (2006), Market Services and 
the Productivity Race, 1850-2000: Britain in 
International Perspective. Cambridge: 








1935 Japan Fukao, K., D. Ma, and T. Yuan (2007) “Real 
GDP in pre-war East Asia: a 1934–36 
benchmark purchasing power parity 
comparison with the U.S” Review of Income 
and Wealth, 53(3): 503–537. 
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1935 Taiwan Fukao, K., D. Ma, and T. Yuan (2007) “Real 
GDP in pre-war East Asia: a 1934–36 
benchmark purchasing power parity 
comparison with the U.S” Review of Income 
and Wealth, 53(3): 503–537. 
 
    
1935 South Korea Fukao, K., Ma, D. and Yuan, T. (2007), 
REAL GDP IN PRE-WAR EAST ASIA: A 
1934–36 BENCHMARK PURCHASING 
POWER PARITY COMPARISON WITH 
THE U.S.. Review of Income and Wealth, 53: 
503–537. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
4991.2007.00243.x 
    
1935 China Fukao, K., D. Ma, and T. Yuan (2007) “Real 
GDP in pre-war East Asia: a 1934–36 
benchmark purchasing power parity 
comparison with the U.S” Review of Income 
and Wealth, 53(3): 503–537. 
 
    
1950 India Broadberry, S. and B. Gupta, 2010. The 
historical roots of India’s service-led 
development: A sectoral analysis of Anglo-
Indian productivity differences, 1870–2000, 
In Explorations in Economic History, Volume 
47, Issue 3, pp. 264-278, ISSN 0014-4983, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2009.09.004. 
table 5, p. 
268 
  
1955 Soviet Union Bergson, A. (1972). The Comparative 









1958 Thailand Usher, D. (1963). The Thai National Income 
at United Kingom Prices. Bulletin of the 
Oxford University Institute of Economics & 
Statistics, 25: 199–214. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
0084.1963.mp25003003.x 









This new version of the MPD includes all new historical income estimates that have become 
available since the previous update (Bolt and Van Zanden, 2014). For sources of all series not 
updated as indicated in the table below, please consult Bolt and Van Zanden (2914). 
Table A2: New historical time series included in the paper 
Country Period Source 
Latin America 
Bolivia 1846–1950 
Herranz-Loncán, A. and Peres-Cajías (2016). “Bolivian GDP per capita 
since the mid-nineteenth century” Cliometrica 10: 99-128 
Brazil 1850–1899 
Barro, R.J. and J.F. Ursua, 2008. "Macroeconomic Crises since 1870," 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The 
Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 255-350 
Brazil 1947 onwards National accounts data 
Chile 1810–2004 
Díaz, J.B. Lüders, R. and Wagner, G. (2007) Economia Chilena 1810 - 2000, 
Producto total y sectorial una nueva mirada, Pontificia universidad Catolica 
de Chile, Insituto de Economia, Documeno de Trabajo no. 315 
Chile 2004 onwards National accounts data 
Cuba 1902–1958 
Ward, M. and Devereux, J. (2012). The Road Not Taken: Pre-Revolutionary 
Cuban Living Standards in Comparative Perspective. The Journal of 
Economic History, 72(1), 104-132. doi:10.1017/S0022050711002452 
Cuba 1960–1895 Santamaria Garcia, A. (2005). Las Cuentas nacionales de Cuba, 1960 - 
2005', mimeo 
Mexico 1550–1812 
Arroyo Abad, L., & Van Zanden, J. (2016). Growth under Extractive 
Institutions? Latin American Per Capita GDP in Colonial Times. The 
Journal of Economic History, 76(4), 1182-1215. 
doi:10.1017/S0022050716000954 
Mexico 1812–1870 
Updated data based on Prados de la Escosura, L., ‘Lost decades? Economic 
performance in post-independence Latin America’, Journal of Latin 
America Studies, 41 (2009), pp. 279–307. 
Mexico 1870–1895 Bèrtola, L. and Ocampo, J. A., The economic development of Latin America 




Barro, R.J. and J.F. Ursua, 2008. "Macroeconomic Crises since 1870," 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The 
Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 255-350 
Mexico 2003–2015 OECD National Accounts 
Panama 1906–1945 
De Corso, G. and S. Kalmanovitz (2016). Una estimación del PIB de 
Panamá: 1906-1945, Tiempo&Economía 3 (1). 
Peru 1600–1812 
Arroyo Abad, L., & Van Zanden, J. (2016). Growth under Extractive 
Institutions? Latin American Per Capita GDP in Colonial Times. The 
Journal of Economic History, 76(4), 1182-1215. 
doi:10.1017/S0022050716000954 
Peru 1812–1870 Seminario, B. (2015). El Desarrallo de la Economía Peruana en la Era 
Moderna, Universidad de Pacifico, Lima 
Uruguay 1870–2014 
Bertola, L. (2016). El PIB per Capita de Uruguay 1870 - 2016: una 
reconstruccion. PHES working paper No 48 
Venezuela 1830–2012 
De Corso, G. (2013). El crecimiento economico de Venuzuela, Desde la 
Oligarquia Conservadora Hasta La Revolucion Bolivariana: 1830-2012. 
Uno Vision cuantitativa *: Venezuelan Economic Growth From The 
Conservative Oligarchy To The Bolivarian Revolution (1830-2012), 
Revista De Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American 
Economic History, 31(3), 321-357. doi:10.1017/S0212610913000190 
Venezuela 2012 onwards National accounts data 
   
Europe 
England 1252–1870 
Broadberry, S.N., B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen 
(2015), British Economic Growth 1270-1870 Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Finland 1600–1860 
Eloranta, J., Voutilainen, M. and Nummela, I. (2016).  “Estimating Finnish 
Economic Growth Before 1860” mimeo.  
France 1250–1800 
Ridolfi, L. (2016) “The French economy in the longue durée. A study on 
real wages, working days and economic performance from Louis IX to the 
Revolution (1250-1789)” Dissertation IMT School for Advanced Studies, 
Lucca, available at http://e-theses.imtlucca.it/211/1/Ridolfi_phdthesis.pdf 
Holland 1348–1807 
van Zanden, J. L. and van Leeuwen, B., ‘Persistent but not consistent: the 
growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in 
Economic History, 49 (2012), pp. 119–30. 
Norway 1820–1930 
GDP from Grytten, O.H. (2015). Norwegian gross domestic product by 
industry 1830 - 1930, Norges Bank Working paper 19/2015. Population 
from Maddison (2006). 
Poland 1409–1913 
Malinowski, M. and Van Zanden (2017), Income and its distribution in 
preindustrial Poland, Cliometrica  11 (3): 375 - 404. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-016-0154-5  
Portugal 1530–1850 
Palma, N. and J. Reis (2016). From Convergence to Divergence: Portuguese 
Demography and Economic Growth, 1500-1850. GGDC Research 
Memorandum 161 
Romania 1862–1995 
Axenciuc, V. (2012). Produsul intern brut al Romaniei, Vol. 1, Institutl de 
Economie Nationala, Bucarest 
Romania 1996–2002  ESA (1995) national accounts data 
Romania 2002–2016 ESA (2010) national accounts data 
Spain 1850–2016 
Prados de la Escosura, L. (2017), Spanish Economic Growth, 1850-2015 




Krantz, O. (2017) “Swedish GDP 1300-1560 A Tentative Estimate” Lund 
Papers in Economic History: General Issues; No. 152. 
Sweden 1560–1950 
Schön, L., and O. Krantz (2015) “New Swedish Historical National 
Accounts since the 16th Century in Constant and Current Prices” Lund 
Papers in Economic History no. 140.  
UK 1700–1870 
Broadberry, S.N., B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen 
(2015), British Economic Growth 1270-1870 Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
   
Asia 
China  1952–2008 
Wu, Harry X. (2014), “China’s growth and productivity performance debate 
revisited – Accounting for China’s sources of growth with a new data set” 
The Conference Board Economics Program Working Paper Series 
EWP#14-01. 
China  1661–1933 
Xu, Y. Z. Shi, B. van Leeuwen, Y Ni, Z Zhang, and Y Ma, (2016) 'Chinese 
National Income, ca. 1661-1933', Australian Economic History Review 
57(3), 368–393.  
India 1600–1870 
Broadberry, S.N., Custodis, J. and Gupta, B. (2015), “India and the great 
divergence: an Anglo-Indian comparison of GDP per capita, 1600–1871” 
Explorations in Economic History, 55: 58-75 
Turkey 
  
Pamuk, S. (2009). “Estimating GDP per capita for the Ottoman Empire in a 
European Comparative Framework, 1500-1820”,  paper presented at the 
XVth World Economic History Congress, August 2009, Utrecht. 
Singapore 
1900–1959 
Barro, R.J. and J.F. Ursua, 2008. "Macroeconomic Crises since 1870," 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The 
Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 255-350 





Syria 1820, 1870, 1913, 
1950 
Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 
1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828.  
Lebanon 1820, 1870, 1913, 
1950 
Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 
1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828.  
Jordan 1820, 1870, 1913, 
1950 
Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 
1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828.  
Egypt 1820, 1870, 1913, 
1950 
Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 
1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828.  
Saudi Arabia 1820, 1870, 1913, 
1950 
Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 
1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828.  
Iraq 1820, 1870, 1913, 
1950 
Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 
1820, The Journal of Economic History, vol 66, no. 3, pp. 809 - 828.  
Iran 1820, 1870, 1913, 
1950 
Pamuk, S. (2006), Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 









Fourie, J. and Van Zanden, J.L. (2013). GDP in the Dutch Cape Colony: the 
Nationals Accounts of a Slave-Based Society, South African Journal of 
Economics, vol. 81 (4): 467 - 490 
39 
 
B. Multiple benchmark implementation 
Combining relative income comparisons with very long time series of economic growth can 
yield results that are impossible to square with information from other sources. Relying on 
multiple benchmark comparison can alleviate such problems, but especially when a comparison 
is the first in a time series, it can also be a source of problems. We identified three categories 
of problems, related to either problematic benchmark comparisons or time series: 
1. Too low: For a long and persistent period of time, income levels drop below the absolute 
poverty (or subsistence) level of $1.90 per day (approximately $700/year, in 2011 prices). 
While poverty can be widespread – indicating that a substantial fractions of the population 
lives on less than $700 per year – it is rare outside periods of severe conflict for the average 
income level in a country to be lower than $700. For illustration, in ICP 2011, only the 
Democratic Republic of Congo was below this level at $680 and this country had an income 
level above $700 before 1996 and since 2012, showing such below-subsistence spells are 
mostly temporary rather than persistent.   
2. Too high: While it is no rule that the United States should be the highest-income country in 
the world, higher incomes are typically only observed in countries with substantial oil 
exports (in ICP 2011: Qatar, Norway, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates) or in otherwise 
unique and particular circumstances (Luxembourg, Singapore and Switzerland). So if we 
find that, for example, oil-exporting countries already had high income levels according to 
official growth statistics, before oil exports began or before the 1973 rise in oil prices, these 
are reasons for worry. 
3. Large swings: Especially before the more thoroughly vetted procedures of ICP 2005 and 
ICP 2011, benchmark price comparison differed substantially in quality across countries 
and comparisons. For example, there are cases where a particular country in a particular 
year relied on the exchange rate as the PPP for a sizeable share of its product categories. 
Also, if countries happen to be in unstable macroeconomic conditions around the time of a 
benchmark price measurement – such as Zimbabwe in 2005 or some Latin American 
countries in 1980 – the resulting benchmark level may be uncertain and distorted. These 
may exhibit as large swings in relative income levels between benchmarks. 
4. PWT estimation: Problematic time series of real GDP may not only stem from the historical 
or ICP benchmarks, but may instead be related to the data and methods used in the Penn 
World Table (PWT) for interpolating between benchmarks or extrapolating from the first 
(or last) benchmark comparison. While in the MPD, we only have information on GDP 
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levels, PWT price levels are computed using prices and expenditure for major expenditure 
categories: household consumption, government consumption, investment, exports and 
imports. Relative cross-country price information for exports and imports is available 
separately and detailed National Accounts deflators are used to in extrapolation. These data 
and methods can result in large swings in real GDP between benchmarks or trends that seem 
hard to square with observed GDP information. One reason can be that the expenditure-
level deflators are inconsistent with GDP deflators. In such cases, we do not use the 
estimated relative prices from PWT, but instead interpolate or extrapolate at the GDP level 
We also rely on the Balassa-Samuelson relationship between the (log) price level and (log) 
GDP per capita level as a diagnostic tool. Following Hassan (2016), we estimate a quadratic 
function (i.e. including log GDP per capita and log GDP per capita squared) based on all 
benchmark comparisons, using the GDP per capita level relative to the United States to put the 
independent variable on an equal basis as the price level variable.  
On a country-by-country basis, we examined trends in income levels, identifying the type of 
problems discussed above (income levels that are too low, too high, or change too rapidly 
between benchmarks). Especially in cases where the observed price level from a benchmark 
comparison is substantially higher or lower than expected based on the Balassa-Samuelson 
relationship we see good reasons for omitting that benchmark comparison from the computation 
of the dataset. Below, we list these choices by benchmark comparison. Especially in cases of 
oil-exporting countries, the problem of income levels that are too high cannot be resolved by 
eliminating benchmarks, so in those cases we choose to truncate the time series. The list of 
these choices also follows. Note that real GDP data based on all benchmarks and time series 




Historical benchmarks Year Reason 
Indonesia 1820 Too low 
China 1840 Too low 
Greece 1929 Too low 
Poland 1929 Too low 
Thailand 1958 Too high 
 
Braithwaite (1968) Year Reason 
Bolivia 1960 Too low 
Brazil 1960 Too low 
Chile 1960 Too low 
Colombia 1960 Too low 
Ecuador 1960 Too low 
Guatemala 1960 Too low 
Honduras 1960 Too low 
Haiti 1960 Too low 
Peru 1960 Too low 
Uruguay 1960 Too low 
 
ICP PPPs Year Reason 
Iran 1970 Too low 
Iran 1975 Too low 
Sri Lanka 1975 Too low 
Marocco 1980 Too low 
Tunisia 1980 Too low 
Argentina 1980 Large swings 
Egypt 1985 Too low 
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ICP PPPs Year Reason 
Iran 1985 Too low 
Sierra Leone 1985 Too low 
Zimbabwe 1985 Large swings 
Equatorial Guinea 1996 Too low 
Iran 1996 Too low 
Guinea 1996 Too low 
Lebanon 1996 Too low 
Nigeria 1996 Large swings 
Syria 1996 Large swings 
Zimbabwe 1996 Too low 
Iran 1970 Too low 
Iran 1975 Too low 
Sri Lanka 1975 Too low 
Marocco 1980 Too low 
Tunisia 1980 Too low 
Argentina 1980 Large swings 
Egypt 1985 Too low 
Iran 1985 Too low 
Sierra Leone 1985 Too low 
Zimbabwe 1985 Large swings 
Equatorial Guinea 1996 Too low 
Iran 1996 Too low 
Guinea 1996 Too low 
Lebanon 1996 Too low 
Nigeria 1996 Large swings 
Syria 1996 Large swings 




Omitted time series Period Reason 
Algeria Before 1970 Too high 
Angola Before 1975 Too high 
Bahrain Before 1970 Too high 
Kuwait Before 1974 Too high 
Qatar Before 1974 Too high 
Peru Before 1855 Too low 
Romania Before 1875 Too low 





C. Latin America 
Providing new estimates of income levels in Latin America has proven to be a particular 
challenge as the combination of relative price benchmarks with current National Accounts data 
often leads to notably lower income levels with especially implausible implications over the 
long run. This appendix discusses how the new estimates relate to those of Maddison (2006, 
Table A2-g), motivating our main decisions and their drawbacks along the way. 
Table C1. GDP per capita in 1980 for 16 Latin American countries based on current 
market exchange rates 
  ICP 1980    Current National Accounts Current 
  USD (XR) USA=1  USD (XR) USA=1 NA/ICP 1980 
Argentina 7384 0.65  11100 0.89 1.50 
Bolivia 942 0.08  631 0.05 0.67 
Brazil 2059 0.18  1537 0.12 0.75 
Chile 2477 0.22  2615 0.21 1.06 
Colombia 1295 0.11  1660 0.13 1.28 
Costa Rica 2119 0.19  2616 0.21 1.23 
Dominican Republic 1192 0.10  1468 0.12 1.23 
Ecuador 1463 0.13  1771 0.14 1.21 
El Salvador 743 0.06  774 0.06 1.04 
Guatemala 1085 0.09  958 0.08 0.88 
Honduras 674 0.06  949 0.08 1.41 
Panama 1816 0.16  1919 0.15 1.06 
Paraguay 1403 0.12  1255 0.10 0.89 
Peru 1196 0.10  926 0.07 0.77 
Uruguay 3459 0.30  3438 0.28 0.99 
Venezuela 4621 0.40  4304 0.35 0.93 
       
United States 11448 1.00  12468 1.00 1.09 
Sources: ICP 1980 from United Nations (1987, Table 1), Current National Accounts based on Maddison GDP 
series and United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/), 
December 2015; except El Salvador (World Bank, World Development Indicators). 
Notes: USD (XR) refers to United States dollars, converted using exchange rates. Maddison (2006, Table A2-g) 
reports that GDP levels were adjusted upwards after the ICP 1980 report to correct for underestimation of the  
informal sector for Argentina (+36%), Peru (+6.5%) and Venezuela (+17.2%). The reported figures in this table 
incorporate these adjustments. The ‘Current National Accounts’ figures rely on the source’s ‘IMF-based exchange 




For most countries in Latin America, Maddison (2006) relied on the ICP 1980 benchmark 
(United Nations, 1987), which he subsequently extrapolated to 1990.28 For most countries, this 
1980 comparison is also the first benchmark comparison that is incorporated in the new 
Maddison series and thereby the anchor for earlier years, making it a sensible starting point of 
this discussion. Table C1 compares the GDP per capita figures used by Maddison and figures 
based on current vintage data, from the UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database. Both 
sets of figures are converted to US dollars using market exchange rates, so the principal 
difference between the two sets are revisions to National Accounts data.29,30 Such revisions can 
relate to changing accounting systems, such as from the System of National Accounts (SNA) 
of 1968 to SNA 1993 and SNA 2008, but also to changes of the benchmark year and source 
revisions. These revisions are known to be substantial, see for an overview of the impact of the 
adoption of SNA 1993 in Latin America, see Olinto Ramos, Pastor and Rivas (2008). They 
show that the adoption of new accounting rules and the change in benchmark year led to 
sizeable changes in the level of nominal GDP, ranging from -8.2 to +19.2 percent. 
National Accounts revisions are typically considered to lead to an improved perspective on 
economic activity. However, these revisions pose a challenge for the pre-revision period. 
Ideally, a country’s statistical office would rework its previous set of National Accounts based 
on new accounting rules and estimation methods. In practice, a typical revised set of National 
Accounts will include estimates for several years based on updated methodologies. However, 
extending revisions for longer periods of time is usually not a priority at statistical agencies, so 
a more common practice is to ‘splice’ together the old time series and the new, i.e. assume that 
the new level is a better reflection of economic activity but that economic growth was not mis-
measured in the past.31 Prados de la Escosura (2016) criticizes this ‘retropolation’ approach, 
specifically for the case of Spain, and proposes an alternative interpolation method. However, 
                                                 
28 Exceptions are Jamaica and Mexico, neither of which gives rise to particular concerns, so we focus on the 16 
countries from ICP 1980. 
29 Note also that several of these countries underwent one or more currency reforms or switched to or from using 
US dollars. We assume these changes to the unit of account have been appropriately carried out. This is not 
guaranteed as UN National Accounts data imply that GDP levels in El Salvador (in US dollars) were only one 
third of the level before the change from Colones to US dollars, while the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators show a level that is broadly comparable. 
30 Population estimates may also be revised; for instance the current estimate of the population of the United States 
in 1980 is 229.6 million compared to 227.7 million in United Nations (1987). In most cases these revisions are 
small, though in some cases they represent a notable part of the overall change in GDP per capita figures. For 
example, in Colombia population increased from 25.79 to 27.74 million, a revision of 7.6 percent. 
31 One prominent counterexample is the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, which maintains a current database of 
National Income and Product Accounts from 1929 onwards. 
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to what extent this approach would be generally applicable is hard to assess. Furthermore, the 
challenges in the Latin American context are greater because of the numerous episodes of 
macroeconomic instability in the twentieth century, with large swings in prices and exchange 
rates and currency reforms or dollarization.  
Table C2. GDP price level in 1980 for 16 Latin American countries 
  ICP 1980, GK ICP 1980, GEKS PWT 
Argentina 1.42 1.66 1.71 
Bolivia 0.59 0.72 0.67 
Brazil 0.62 0.70 0.72 
Chile 0.68 0.86 0.92 
Colombia 0.47 0.54 0.58 
Costa Rica 0.68 0.77 0.81 
Dominican Republic 0.59 0.69 0.92 
Ecuador 0.57 0.69 0.71 
El Salvador 0.52 0.61 0.64 
Guatemala 0.47 0.60 0.63 
Honduras 0.56 0.67 0.71 
Panama 0.56 0.76 0.82 
Paraguay 0.67 0.80 0.85 
Peru 0.45 0.55 0.57 
Uruguay 0.83 0.86 0.91 
Venezuela 0.73 0.94 0.93 
    
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sources: ICP 1980, GK from United Nations (1987, Table 1); ICP 1980, GEKS computations based on ICP 1980 
data; PWT: price level of GDPo (pl_gdpo) from PWT 9.0, normalized to USA=1, see Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer 
(2015). 
Notes: GDP price level is the PPP for GDP divided by the exchange rate. GK stands for Geary-Khamis and GEKS 
for Gini-Elteto-Kovecs-Szulc as two alternative PPP computation methods, see e.g. Diewert (2013). 
Beyond revisions to GDP per capita figures, changes to the computation of purchasing power 
parities (PPPs) is another source of differences between Maddison (2006) and current estimates. 
Table C2 provides three estimates for the 1980 GDP price level, defined as the PPP for GDP 
divided by the market exchange rate. The first column, ‘ICP 1980, GK’, is the main relative 
price level as reported in United Nations (1987), computed from detailed price and expenditure 
data using the Geary-Khamis method. This method has come under increased criticism in the 
period since the ICP 1980 data were released, primarily because the method suffers from 
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substitution bias, see e.g. Diewert (2013). The alternative GEKS method, does not suffer from 
this shortcoming and is currently the method of choice for computing PPPs (see e.g. World 
Bank, 2014). 
`The ‘ICP 1980, GEKS’ column shows that this change in computation method has a substantial 
effect on price levels, increasing prices of all countries relative to the United States, by an 
average of 20 percent. The final column, ‘PWT’, uses the relative price data as provided in the 
Penn World Table, version 9.0. The main reason for differences with the GEKS column is that 
PWT includes estimates of PPPs for exports and imports of goods, see Feenstra et al. (2015). 
This further increases price levels, by an average of 6 percent, though for the Dominican 
Republic the effect is much larger. These two differences together serve to depress relative 
income levels in Latin America compared to Maddison’s (2006) estimates. 
Table C3. GDP per capita in PPP-converted US dollars in 1980 for 16 Latin American 
countries 
  GDP per capita in USD (PPP)   Relative GDP per capita (US=1) 
  Original Rebased   Original Rebased 
Argentina 5210 6488  0.46 0.52 
Bolivia 1591 938  0.14 0.08 
Brazil 3337 2144  0.29 0.17 
Chile 3622 2836  0.32 0.23 
Colombia 2784 2874  0.24 0.23 
Costa Rica 3137 3240  0.27 0.26 
Dominican Republic 2006 1601  0.18 0.13 
Ecuador 2583 2509  0.23 0.20 
El Salvador 1418 1204  0.12 0.10 
Guatemala 2324 1529  0.20 0.12 
Honduras 1204 1334  0.11 0.11 
Panama 3220 2345  0.28 0.19 
Paraguay 2108 1481  0.18 0.12 
Peru 2663 1634  0.23 0.13 
Uruguay 4180 3771  0.37 0.30 
Venezuela 6317 4625  0.55 0.37 
      
United States 11448 12468   1.00 1.00 
Sources: see Tables C1 and C2 
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Notes: GDP per capita in USD (PPP) is computed as GDP per capita in USD (XR) from Table 1 divided by the 
GDP price level from Table 2. For example, the ‘Original’ estimate for Argentina is computed as 7384/1.42=5210, 
while the ‘Rebased’ estimate is computed as 11100/1.71=6488. 
 
Table C1 showed the impact of GDP per capita revisions and Table C2 showed the impact of 
changes in PPP computation methods. Table C3 combines these two factors in estimates of 
PPP-converted GDP per capita. As the final two columns show, the combination of factors 
result in lower levels of GDP per capita relative to the United States, with the changes from GK 
to GEKS PPPs as the most systematic factor. Heterogeneity across countries is substantial, with 
Colombia’s relative income level remaining almost unchanged, while Peru’s relative income 
level declines from 23 percent to 13 percent of the US level. This heterogeneity is primarily 
due to differences in GDP per capita revisions (Table 1): in Columbia GDP per capita has been 
revised upwards, while in Peru it has been revised downwards. 
Table C4. GDP per capita in PPP-converted 2011 US dollars for 16 Latin American 
countries – 1800-2011 
  1800 1850 1900 1950 1980 2011 
Argentina 1594 2144 4925 8542 14431 20003 
Bolivia   790 1627 2229 5331 
Brazil 600 600 606 1549 5052 14831 
Chile  1011 2533 4399 7041 19705 
Colombia 819 681 946 2984 6825 11788 
Costa Rica    2855 8012 12366 
Dominican Republic    1663 3969 11679 
Ecuador   903 2441 5826 9985 
El Salvador    1370 2754 7607 
Guatemala    2130 3793 6650 
Honduras    1838 3168 4421 
Panama    2073 5569 16762 
Paraguay    1306 3517 7377 
Peru   604 2048 3900 10044 
Uruguay 1643 2205 3027 6269 9825 17211 
Venezuela 514 903 885 4055 11355 17746 
       
United States 1980 2825 6252 15241 29613 49675 
Notes: The column 1980 implies the same relative income levels as the ‘rebased’ figures from Table C3; e.g. for 
Argentina 15409/29613=0.52. The difference in figures is because the numbers in Table 3 were 1980 US dollars, 




As may be expected, these changes to the 1980 benchmark levels have substantial effects on 
long-run income levels. Table C4 shows the PPP-converted GDP per capita figures for the 16 
Latin American countries since 1800 (or the earliest available year), denominated in 2011 US 
dollars. This points to the importance of a more extensive set of benchmark comparisons for 
these countries, to establish whether these patterns, implied by the time series of economic 
growth and the different benchmarks accords with the historical reality. 
The Case of Cuba32 
Cuba deserves special attention because it is a country of 11 million that used to be a prosperous, 
middle-income country before its Communist revolution (Ward and Devereux, 2012) and has 
been on a downward (relative) trajectory since. However, due (at least in part) to its current 
political system, it has not actively participated in the ICP before the 2011 round, leading to a 
paucity of information that can be used to compare income levels. Moreover, even its 
participation in ICP 2011 did not lead to estimates of real GDP per capita that were deemed 
reliable enough to publish. The ICP 2011 report only reports Cuba’s relative price level, at 32.2 
percent of the US level, but: “The official GDP of Cuba for reference year 2011 is 68,990.15 
million in national currency. However, this number and its breakdown into main aggregates are 
not shown in the tables because of methodological comparability issues. Therefore, Cuba’s 
results are provided only for the PPP and price level index” (World Bank 2014, p. 29). The 
reported price level of 32.2 percent of the US level seems low, on a similar level as that of India, 
while the official GDP per capita level, valued at current exchange rates, is much higher for 
Cuba (12 percent of the US level) than for India (3 percent). The predicted relative price level 
at Cuba’s level of GDP per capita is between 52 and 59 percent of the US level, depending on 
the Balassa-Samuelson relationship. Similarly, the crowd-sourced price comparison website 
Numbeo shows a relative cost-of-living in Havana that is 67 percent of the US level.33 
One clear conclusion from this discussion is that combining the ICP 2011 relative price level 
for Cuba with official GDP per capita data does not result in plausible real GDP per capita 
figures and would substantially overestimate Cuba’s comparative income level. It would thus 
be more sensible to treat Cuba as a ‘non-benchmark’ economy, like Afghanistan and North 
Korea, and use an econometric estimate of its real GDP per capita level than a direct 
                                                 
32 We would like to thank John Devereux for helpful suggestions and discussions on this topic 




measurement. An estimate by the United Nations for its Human Development Report (2016) 
seems plausible, as deemed by Cuba’s statistical office and experts of the region. This puts 
Cuba’s real GNI per capita in 2011 at 6821 (in 2011 US dollars). Using the GDP/GNI ratio 
from the World Development Indicators, this implies a real GDP per capita level in 2011 for 
Cuba of 6928 in 2011 US dollars. Compared to the figures in the final column of Table C4, this 
puts Cuba in the lower part of Latin America’s income levels, which seems more plausible than 
the $19068 implied by the official GDP per capita data and the ICP 2011 price level, which 
would have put Cuba at a similar income level as Chile. We therefore use the $6928 as the 




The new methodology for extending income levels back in time appear to have limited 
consequences for the income estimates of the far majority of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
For a number of African countries the new methodology results in substantially different 
income levels compared to those originally published by Maddison (2006). This appendix 
discusses how the new estimates and the original estimates relate to each other.  
Maddison (2006) relied on the Penn-World tables 5.6 for his estimates of the 1990 benchmark 
GDP levels for all African countries except Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and 
five very small countries. For those countries Maddison (2006: 221) assumed that the 1990 
GDP per capita was equal to the average of the 50 African countries covered by the PWT. When 
using the multiple benchmarks, for 26 out of 47 countries this in effect means using the 2011 
and the 2005 PPPs. For the other countries, various earlier benchmarks are available. Kenya is 
the first Sub-Saharan African country to participate in an ICP round in 1970, and in 1985 
already 15 countries participate in the ICP program. Using the multiple benchmark approach 
leads to very similar relative income estimates compared to the original Maddison series for 
about half of the African countries. For most other countries the multiple benchmark approach 
leads to slightly different but we think still reasonable income estimates. However, for some of 
the countries, the earlier income estimates deviate away from previous patterns when using 
multiple benchmarks. This leads to a reshuffling in the order of countries compared to the 
original series, when we rank them from poor to rich. The best way forward would be to have 
benchmarks for 1950 for all African countries, as that would provide the best comparison of 
relative income levels in that year allowing us to ‘anchor’ the annual series. 
As there currently exists no such anchor, we created benchmarks for African countries for the 
year 1950 based on the indirect approach. This indirect approach has been developed in the 
context of estimating trends in GDP per capita, within countries, over time, for periods in which 
data constraints make it impossible to estimate GDP in the usual way. The method used was 
pioneered by Malanima (2010, for Northern Italy 1300-1850), and has now been used for many 
country studies (of, amongst others, Germany (Pfister 2003), France (Ridolfi 2016), Spain 
(Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013), Poland (Malinowski and Van Zanden 2016), 
Mexico and Peru (Arroyo-Abad and van Zanden 2015). Here we propose adapting this approach 
from a time-series to a cross-country within Africa setting. 
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We first explain the approach, and then present the resulting GDP pc levels for the African 
countries for which we could obtain the underlying data. The starting point of the indirect 
approach is to assume each country can usefully be represented as a two-sector economy, 
consisting of an agricultural sector (𝑎) and a non-agricultural sector (𝑛). Nominal GDP in 






where 𝑄 denotes the price level and 𝑄 denotes net production. If all variables in equation (D1) 
were known, it would be straightforward to compare real GDP between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗. If we 
follow Feenstra et al. (2015) and assume an economy-wide translog function that is 
homogenous of degree one in factor endowments and has identical second-order parameters on 
factor endowments across countries, we can express relative real GDP per capita as the 







































Yet the absence of sufficient data is what motivates this indirect approach, so we have to impose 
more structure and assumptions on the problem to arrive at a method that can be implemented 
in practice. First, assume that food production equals food consumption, 𝐹 ≡ 𝑄𝑎  (dropping 
country subscripts for conciseness). As discussed in Allen (2000), net food trade accounted for 
only 10 percent of food production around 1800 in the Netherlands and United Kingdom, two 
of the most open economies at the time, so violations of this assumption are not likely to be 
substantial. Second, assume that food consumption per capita is primarily determined by 
income per capita 𝑤: 
𝐹
𝑁
≡ 𝑓 = 𝑤𝛽  (𝐷3), 
where 𝑁𝑖 is the population in country 𝑖. The crucial parameter here is 𝛽, the income elasticity 
of food demand, whose choice we discuss below.  
We approximate income per capita by the real wage level of laborers. This measure, pioneered 
by Allen (2001), relates nominal wages of building laborers to the cost of a basket of goods that 
                                                 
34 A Törnqvist index is a superlative index, like the Fisher index (Diewert, 1976) and in many practical situations 
the two indexes provide very similar results. 
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would ensure a minimum level of subsistence, i.e. consume a sufficient amount of calories, 
other nutrients, fuel, clothing and shelter to survive. 








where 𝐿𝑥 is the labor input in sector 𝑥. 
Fourth, we assume that labor input in agriculture relative to labor input in non-agriculture is 










where 𝑢 is the urbanization rate – the share of the population living in urban areas. These 
assumptions imply the following expressions for the main variables in equation (D2): 







  (𝐷6𝑏),  
𝑄 = 𝑄𝑎 + 𝑄𝑛 = 𝑁𝑖𝑤𝑖
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1 + (𝑝 − 1)𝑢
≡ 𝑠𝑎   (𝐷6𝑑). 
An implication of the assumption in equation (D4) is that there is no systematic difference 
between the volume share of sectoral output in GDP and the value share of sectoral output in 
GDP. Expressing equation (D2) in per capita terms, so 𝑞 = 𝑄 𝑁⁄  and applying the expressions 

























That leaves us with two observed variables, the real wage rate 𝑤 and the urbanization rate 𝑢 
and two parameters, the income elasticity of demand for food 𝛽 and the multiple of labor 
productivity in non-agriculture relative to agriculture, 𝑝. The literature has produced a set of 
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price and income elasticities which are plausible for the pre-industrial societies that are studied. 
Allen (2000) assumed an income elasticity of demand of 0.5; Malanima (2010) selected 0.4 and 
Alvaraz Nogal and Leandro Prados de la Escosura (2013) chose 0.3. For our estimates we took 
the middle range value of 𝛽 = 0.4. We set the parameter 𝑝 equal to 2, which is an assumption 
that seems a reasonable reflection of both the contemporaneous and historical record. Gollin, 
Lagakos and Waugh (2014) find that value added per worker in agriculture is, on average, half 
that in the rest of the economy, once correcting for observable differences in human capital and 
working hours. They also find that this labor productivity ratio does not vary systematically 
with the country’s income level. In an historical context, the work of Broadberry et al. (2015), 
and Van Zanden and Van Leeuwen (2012) provide further justification for this assumption. 
We use this approach to estimate relative GDP per capita for African countries in 1950 relative 
to South Africa. Real wage information is obtained from the work of Frankema and van 
Waijenburg (2012), Bolt and Hillbom (2015), for former British Africa. For former French 
African countries we include newly constructed real wage information based on archival 
material. Table D1 shows the results of this exercise, where we South Africa as the base country. 
The reason for this is that these countries are more likely to be similar in structure to the richest 
country in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa, rather than the advanced economies in Europe 
and America. This logic is also applied in ICP, where price and income comparison are first 
made within regions and only then across regions. While this structure has roots in the 
administrative setup of ICP, Deaton and Heston (2010) argue that this structure has an important 
advantage in comparing more-similar countries first, before comparing less-similar countries. 
As Table D1 shows, the indirect benchmark estimates are mostly very similar to the estimates 
based on extrapolation for most countries. The main exceptions are several countries for which 
the original extrapolation leads to very low income levels: Burkina Faso, Mali and Nyasaland 
(present-day Malawi). Given South Africa’s GDP per capita level of $5278 in 1950, this puts 
all countries above subsistence levels, while this is not the case for the extrapolated estimates 
for Burkina Faso, Mali and Nyasaland. We therefore use the estimates in Table D1, linking 






Table D1. Indirect benchmark estimates of relative GDP per capita in 1950 
  Urbanization rate Relative level (ZAF=100) of: Extrapolation 
  Real wages GDP/capita GDP/capita 
South Africa 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mauritius 0.29 0.23 0.60 0.74 
Senegal 0.17 0.20 0.44 0.30 
Ghana 0.15 0.22 0.44 0.29 
Gambia 0.10 0.16 0.35 0.24 
Sudan 0.11 0.14 0.34 0.32 
Sierra Leone 0.07 0.17 0.33 0.13 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.10 0.14 0.33 0.37 
Nigeria 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.26 
Kenya 0.06 0.11 0.26 0.25 
Burkina Faso 0.04 0.12 0.26 0.08 
Botswana 0.03 0.14 0.25 0.13 
Mali 0.09 0.07 0.24 0.10 
Tanganyika 0.04 0.11 0.24 0.19 
Guinea 0.07 0.07 0.23 0.16 
Benin 0.05 0.08 0.23 0.20 
Uganda 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.17 
Niger 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.16 





E. Oil-rich countries 
Some of the largest differences between the original Maddison 1990 benchmark figures and 
more recent figures can found in oil-exporting economies. Table E1 illustrates this for 13 
countries with data for 1990. Not all these countries were major oil exporters already in 1990, 
but for most of these countries substantial differences can be seen between GDP per capita 
based on the original Maddison 1990 figures and the new estimates based on multiple (ICP) 
benchmarks (MBM). The most extreme case is United Arab Emirates, whose income level was 
61 percent of the US level in 1990 according to Maddison, but 343 percent of the US level 
according to the multiple benchmarks estimates. 
Table E1, Relative income levels and oil dependence in 1990 for selected countries 
Country ISO code Oil share GDP per capita (USA=100) ICP coverage 
      Maddison MPD Difference   
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 0 7 5 -2 2005, 2011 
Iran IRN 18 15 13 -2 All except 1980 
Iraq IRQ 3 11 20 9 2005, 2011 
Venezuela VEN 20 35 20 -15 1980, 1996, 2005, 2011 
Algeria DZA 12 12 22 10 2011 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 29 40 26 -14 1985, 1996, 2011 
Oman OMN 45 28 30 2 1996, 2005, 2011 
Bahrain BHR 15 18 39 21 1996, 2005, 2011 
Saudi Arabia SAU 32 38 48 10 2005, 2011 
Kuwait KWT 40 28 63 36 2005, 2011 
Libya LBY n.a. 13 66 52 none 
Qatar QAT 59 30 94 64 1996, 2005, 2011 
United Arab Emirates ARE 4 61 343 282 2011 
Notes: ‘oil share’ is the share of fuels and lubricants exports in real GDP (source: PWT 9.0). Maddison GDP per 
capita figures are computed based on the Maddison (2008) database, MPD is the new Maddison Project Database 
figures. 
Since many of these countries did not participate in ICP benchmarks before 2005, the MPD 
estimates for 1990 are predominantly based on extrapolations using National Accounts figures. 
The heavy reliance on oil exports means that swings in terms of trade will have a substantial 
effect on GDP and places a substantial burden on statistical offices in the countries to produce 
accurate price and volume estimates. The required statistical capacity is not uniformly available 
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in this set of countries. It is therefore sensible to also present the 2011 relative income and price 
levels, in Table E2. 
The table illustrates that even in this benchmark year, several countries show levels of GDP per 
capita that are close to or (substantially) exceed US levels. The relative price levels, in turn, are 
comparatively low as income levels increasing towards those in the US would normally imply 
relative price levels rising to similar levels as well. 
Table E2, Relative income and price levels and oil dependence in 2011 for selected 
countries 
Country ISO code Oil share GDP/capita Price level 
      (USA=100) (USA=100) 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 82 88 55 
Iran IRN 15 36 44 
Iraq IRQ 35 23 43 
Venezuela VEN 30 36 61 
Algeria DZA 25 27 41 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 38 60 61 
Oman OMN 44 89 48 
Bahrain BHR 0 73 61 
Saudi Arabia SAU 39 98 48 
Kuwait KWT 53 155 62 
Libya LBY n.a. 27 50 
Qatar QAT 60 313 57 
United Arab Emirates ARE 41 131 61 
Notes: see Table D1. Price level refers to the price level of GDPo from PWT 9.0. 
To illustrate the peculiarity of GDP per capita figures in this set of countries, it is helpful to also 
compare the level of domestic absorption per capita (consumption plus investment, i.e. GDP 
excluding net exports) and consumption per capita (including household and government 
consumption). Table E3 shows this comparison for 2011. Especially relative consumption 
levels are substantially lower than relative GDP, with Equatorial Guinea as a striking example, 
where GDP/capita was 88 percent of US level, but consumption/capita only 13 percent. All 
countries in this comparison have consumption/capita levels well below those in the US. 
So a first conclusion has to be that for this set of countries in particular, GDP per capita is a 
poor measure of current living standards, with so much of income not consumed or invested 
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domestically, but invested abroad. “Squaring the circle”, whereby GDP per capita would 
accurately reflect current living standards would, in turn, require unrealistically high price 
levels of GDP.35 A second conclusion, based on the comparison between Tables E1 and E2, is 
that some of the National Accounts time series are suspect. For instance, why would the United 
Arab Emirates have a GDP/capita level in 1990 that is even higher than in 2011 while oil exports 
where only one-tenth as large (relative to GDP)? 
Table E3, Relative levels of GDP, domestic absorption and consumption in 2011 
Country ISO code GDP Dom. Absorp. Consumption 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 88 45 13 
Iran IRN 36 31 28 
Iraq IRQ 23 19 19 
Venezuela VEN 36 29 27 
Algeria DZA 27 23 20 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 60 44 43 
Oman OMN 89 61 46 
Bahrain BHR 73 55 50 
Saudi Arabia SAU 98 72 52 
Kuwait KWT 155 76 64 
Libya LBY 27 n.a. n.a. 
Qatar QAT 313 164 61 
United Arab Emirates ARE 131 99 76 
Source: PWT 9.0 
Note: 'Dom. Absorp.’ is domestic absorption. 
For the final comparison, it is helpful to contrast the Maddison 1990 income levels with the 
relative price levels implied by these income levels. This requires additional data on GDP per 
capita converted to US dollars using market exchange rates. To put the magnitudes of these 
                                                 
35 To be more precise: for the relative level of GDP/capita in (for example) Equatorial Guinea to be equal to its 
relative consumption/capita level would imply a GDP price level of 372 percent of the US, a level never observed 
in international price comparisons. 
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relative price levels in context, the final column presents standardized residuals, based on 
comparing the implied price levels to predicted price levels from a Balassa-Samuelson price-
income regression for (the log of) all benchmark price level observations and (the log of) GDP 
per capita converted to US dollars using market exchange rates. It is clear that the price levels 
required to arrive at the Maddison 1990 relative income levels are often unrealistically high and 
sometimes unrealistically low, using a standardized residual of approximately ±2 as a standard 
for realism. So the third conclusion would be that Maddison 1990 income estimates are not a 
plausible alternative to the MBM income estimates. 
Table E4, Relative income and price level in 1990 based on Maddison and price residual 
Country ISO code GDP/capita Price level Standardized 
    (USA=100) (USA=100) Residual 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 7 22 -1.97 
Iran IRN 15 47 0.03 
Iraq IRQ 11 489 7.10 
Venezuela VEN 35 28 -2.39 
Algeria DZA 12 81 1.98 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 40 44 -1.21 
Oman OMN 28 98 1.49 
Bahrain BHR 18 232 4.42 
Saudi Arabia SAU 38 79 0.43 
Kuwait KWT 28 137 2.38 
Libya LBY 13 236 4.93 
Qatar QAT 30 218 3.40 
United Arab Emirates ARE 61 193 1.75 
Note: ‘Standardized residual’ is the difference between the relative price level implied by Maddison’s relative 
income estimates and the price level predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson price-income relationship, standardized 
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